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Multi-hop Wireless Networks (MWNs) represent a class of networks where messages 
are forwarded through multiple hops of wireless transmission. Applications of this newly 
emerging communication paradigm include asset monitoring wireless sensor networks 
(WSNs), command communication mobile ad hoc networks (MANETs), community- or 
campus-wide wireless mesh networks (WMNs), etc.  
Information security is one of the major barriers to the wide-scale deployment of 
MWNs but has received little attention so far. On the one hand, due to the open wireless 
channels and multi-hop wireless transmissions, MWNs are vulnerable to various information 
security threats such as eavesdropping, data injection/modification, node compromising, 
traffic analysis, and flow tracing. On the other hand, the characteristics of MWNs including 
the vulnerability of intermediate network nodes, multi-path packet forwarding, and limited 
computing capability and storage capacity make the existing information security schemes 
designed for the conventional wired networks or single-hop wireless networks unsuitable for 
MWNs. Therefore, newly designed schemes are highly desired to meet the stringent security 
and performance requirements for the information security of MWNs.  
In this research, we focus on three fundamental information security issues in MWNs: 
efficient privacy preservation for source anonymity, which is critical to the information 
security of MWNs; the traffic explosion issue, which targets at preventing denial of service 
(DoS) and enhancing system availability; and the cooperative peer-to-peer information 
exchange issue, which is critical to quickly achieve maximum data availability if the base 
station is temporarily unavailable or the service of the base station is intermittent. We have 
made the following three major contributions. 
Firstly, we identify the severe threats of traffic analysis/flow tracing attacks to the 
information security in network coding enabled MWNs. To prevent these attacks and achieve 
source anonymity in MWNs, we propose a network coding based privacy-preserving scheme. 
The unique “mixing” feature of network coding is exploited in the proposed scheme to 
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confuse adversaries from conducting advanced privacy attacks, such as time correlation, size 
correlation, and message content correlation. With homomorphic encryption functions, the 
proposed scheme can achieve both privacy preservation and data confidentiality, which are 
two critical information security requirements.  
Secondly, to prevent traffic explosion and at the same time achieve source 
unobservability in MWNs, we propose a network coding based privacy-preserving scheme, 
called SUNC (Source Unobservability using Network Coding). Network coding is utilized in 
the scheme to automatically absorb dummy messages at intermediate network nodes, and 
thus, traffic explosion induced denial of service (DoS) can be naturally prevented to ensure 
the system availability. In addition to ensuring system availability and achieving source 
unobservability, SUNC can also thwart internal adversaries.  
Thirdly, to enhance the data availability when a base station is temporarily unavailable 
or the service of the base station is intermittent, we propose a cooperative peer-to-peer 
information exchange scheme based on network coding. The proposed scheme can quickly 
accomplish optimal information exchange in terms of throughput and transmission delay.  
For each research issue, detailed simulation results in terms of computational overhead, 
transmission efficiency, and communication overhead, are given to demonstrate the efficacy 
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With the development of the Internet and the boom of various applications, wireless 
networks have experienced an explosive expansion. Wireless Local Area Network (WLAN) 
technologies, represented by Wi-Fi [1], are so successful as to be accepted quickly by all 
over the world. Wireless Metropolitan Area Networks (WMANs) such as WiMAX [2] are 
also developing quickly on the way of being widely deployed. Wireless Personal Area 
Networks (WPANs) and Wireless Body Area Networks (WBANs) are very promising in the 
applications of personal entertainment and E-health [3]. Moreover, other emerging wireless 
technologies [4] have also attracted a lot of attentions from both the academia and industry.  
Wireless networks have a lot of advantages for them to be adopted so quickly by users 
all around the world. The main advantages include the following features.  
 Convenience: The open nature of wireless channels allows users to access network 
resources conveniently from any location within radio coverage. With the 
increasing popularity of portable devices such as laptops, PDAs, netbook, and smart 
phones, this feature is particularly important.  
 Mobility: With the emergence of public wireless networks, such as a campus wireless 
network [5], users can maintain a steady connection with their desired networks to 
access the Internet without intermission even when they are in a moving car.  
 Low Cost: Wireless networking hardware is relatively cheap especially when 
compared with the potentially increasing cost of physical cables in wired networks.  
 Expandability: Wireless networks can serve a suddenly-increased number of clients 
with the existing equipment. On the contrary, additional clients would require 
additional wiring in a wired network.  
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 Easy Deployment: Compared with wired networks, which have the cost and 
complexity of actual physical cables winding through floors, the initial setup of 
even an infrastructure-based wireless network requires only a single access point.  
For a given networking situation, current wireless solutions may not be applicable for a 
number of reasons. Most of them are related to the limitations of current technologies.  
 Range: The current effective range of an 802.11b/g network with standard equipment 
is on the order of tens of meters. Although it is sufficient for an average home or a 
small office, it is insufficient for a larger structure such as a community. New 
technologies are being developed, and multi-hop wireless networking is very 
promising in extending the radio coverage range.  
 Security: The open nature of wireless channels not only brings convenience, but also 
makes the channels vulnerable to various attacks such as eavesdropping and 
jamming [6]. In a wired network, an adversary has to overcome the physical 
obstacle to tap into the actual wires, but this is not an obstacle any more in wireless 
networks.  
 Reliability: Wireless signals are broadcast in nature, causing a wide variety of 
interference. In addition, the complex propagation effect, such as fading and 
multipath, makes wireless networks more unreliable.  
 Speed: The speed of most wireless networks (typically 1-54 Mbps) is relatively slow 
compared with wired networks (100 Mbps to several Gbps). New wireless 
standards such as 802.11n are to address this limitation and will support the peak 
throughput up to 200 Mbps.  
In the future, wireless communication will keep developing, and wireless networks will 
get more extensive deployment. A variety of new technologies will be exploited to overcome 
the limitations. New evolutions on modulation and multiplexing technologies will enhance 
the reliability and speed of wireless channels. New security and privacy schemes will 
diminish the vulnerability of wireless networks. Multi-hop Wireless Networks (MWNs) [7] 
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are regarded as a promising solution for extending the limit radio coverage range of wireless 
networks. In addition, through multi-path packet forwarding, they are also promising in 
enhancing reliability, speed, and security.  
1.1 MWN Motivating Application Scenarios 
In addition to the improvement for existing wireless networks, MWNs motivate some new 
application scenarios. In this section, we will briefly introduce the following three MWN 
motivating application scenarios.  
1.1.1 Asset Monitoring Wireless Sensor Networks 
Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) [8] are promising in many application scenarios, and thus 
attract much attention from both the academia and the industry. Most current research on 
WSNs is focused on the system architecture, node deployment, and communication protocols 
of multi-hop WSNs. Multi-hop wireless networking is critical to WSNs since it is not only 
the requirements of applications such as data collection but also the requirements of network 
connectivity and node battery life.  
An important application driven by WSN and MWN technologies in the future will be 
the applications that monitor a valuable asset. For example, sensors can be deployed in 
natural habitats to monitor endangered animals [9]. When an endangered animal such as an 
elephant or a panda passes by a sensor, the sensor perceives and records the activity of this 
animal. The data storage capacity of each sensor is limited, and the sensed data may be lost if 
it cannot be collected in time. Data collection can be done in two kinds of methods. The first 
method is that the administrator of the natural habitat can drive a car to collect the data 
manually. The second method is to utilize MWN technologies to form the deployed sensors 
into a WSN; then, some sink nodes can be deployed to collect the sensed data through multi-
hop wireless transmission automatically. In this thesis, we consider only the second data 
collection method as well as the corresponding multi-hop WSN used for data collection. In 
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these asset monitoring applications, security and privacy issues are very critical, and the 
location privacy of source node is especially important. The details of security and privacy 
threats to asset monitoring WSNs will be explored in Chapter 2.1.  
1.1.2 Command Communication Mobile Ad hoc Networks 
Mobile Ad hoc Networks (MANET) have many attractive applications, such as emergency 
communication, disaster rescue, battlefield communication, and some commercial 
applications [10]. Multi-hop wireless networking technologies can assist MANET to reach 
farther communication range more reliably, thus to achieve a better mission completion in 
the above applications. A command communication system can be transplanted to MANETs, 
forming a command communication MANET. 
Command communication MANET is very suitable for battlefield situations since no 
infrastructure can be warranted in those scenarios [11]. A command communication MANET 
may be comprised of several or tens of mobile nodes, which can be the carry-on wireless 
devices of equipped soldiers. These nodes can communicate with each other through direct 
transmission or multi-hop forwarding. In this network, one or two nodes may be the critical 
nodes, which are probably the commanders of the military group. Most command 
communication activities take place between the commanders and soldiers. Soldiers may 
report a real-time situation of the battlefield, and commanders may issue an order to soldiers 
to indicate what to do for the next step. This unique communication pattern may leak the 
location privacy of critical nodes. In addition, due to the hostile battlefield environment, 
command communication MANETs are very prone to malicious attacks. A simple 
vulnerability may be utilized by adversaries, thus probably leading to soldier casualties or 
mission impossible. Thus, security and privacy protection is very critical to command 
communication MANETs, and various threats will be investigated in details in Chapter 2.1.  
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1.1.3 Wireless Mesh Networks 
Wireless Mesh Networks (WMNs) have been extensively regarded as a key technology for 
next-generation wireless networking [12]. Assisted with multi-hop wireless networking 
technologies, WMNs have inspired many novel application scenarios such as community 
networking, enterprise networking, building automation, broadband home networking, and 
high-speed metropolitan area network.  
WMNs are dynamically self-organized and self-configured, and nodes in WMNs 
automatically establish ad hoc networks and maintain mesh connectivity. Through 
maintaining the wireless mesh backbone, WMNs distinguish their capacities from ad hoc 
networks. Through multi-hop forwarding, the same coverage can be achieved by WMNs with 
much lower transmission power. However, the available MAC and routing protocols are not 
scalable for multi-hop forwarding, and throughput drops significantly as the number of hops 
increases. In this sense, multi-hop wireless networking technologies are the kernel of WMNs.  
1.2 Research Issues in MWNs: Non-Security Aspects 
Although MWNs are promising in expanding the radio coverage range for the future wireless 
networks, many other requirements should be satisfied before they can be widely adopted.  
With the spread of radio coverage and the increase of wireless users, wireless networks 
need to accommodate more and more portable devices. The computing power and 
transmission rate of a MWN should satisfy the requirement of emerging various applications 
[13]. New applications, especially the live multimedia applications such as IPTV and Video 
on Demand, will certainly raise the requirements of MWN performance.  
Compared with traditional single-hop wireless networks such as cellular networks, 
MWNs have higher requirements in mobility management [14]. Due to not only the increase 
of wireless users but also the decrease of single AP coverage, handoff will be happening 
more frequently in MWNs. For the sake of live applications which are sensitive to handoff 
delay, mobility management in MWNs needs to achieve fast and seamless handoff.  
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Due to the broadcast propagation fashion and the interference effect of wireless signal, 
the robustness and reliability [15] is an important performance metric for WMNs, especially 
when they encounters malicious attacks. The open nature of wireless channels makes 
malicious attacks much easier, and the propagation fashion makes wireless signal more 
vulnerable to interference. To enhance the robustness and reliability of MWNs, not only is 
the progress in signal modulation technologies essential, but the upper layer resource 
allocation and routing technologies are indispensable.  
1.3 Information Security in MWNs: Research Motivations and Contributions 
The term “information security” means protecting information and information systems from 
unauthorized access, use, disclosure, disruption, modification, or destruction in order to 
provide confidentiality, integrity, availability, and privacy [16]. Confidentiality means 
preserving authorized restrictions on access and disclosure for proprietary information; 
integrity means guarding against improper information modification or destruction and 
includes ensuring information non-repudiation and authenticity; availability means ensuring 
timely and reliable access to and use of information [17]; and privacy means preventing 
unauthorized access, use, or disclosure on private information, including personal identity 
information, personal location information, and personal activity information. We will 
discuss our motivations and contributions on information security research in the following 
parts.  
1.3.1 Motivations 
With the evolvement of the Internet, a common user has already been able to obtain a great 
computing power and massive data access capability which was unimaginable only a few 
years ago. These progresses will comprise a security threat if they are in the hands of a 
malicious user. Significant computing power can break a key or password space in a brute 
force way easily, only if the encrypted text or the hashed password is readily available; 
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substantial data access may assist to reveal the confidential or private information; the 
combination of significant computing power and substantial data access, however, will lead 
to a severe threat to security and privacy preservation of MWNs.  
Security and privacy is a major concern of MWNs. For example, attacks such as traffic 
analysis and flow tracking may leak the location information of users and thus expose the 
location privacy. Security and privacy issues not only threaten the current users of wireless 
technologies, but also become one of the main obstacles against the wide adoption of new 
wireless technologies such as multi-hop wireless networking.  
On the one hand, the open and shared nature of wireless channels makes MWNs 
vulnerable to various malicious attacks, such as eavesdropping, data injection/modification, 
node compromising, and traffic analysis. These malicious attacks may pose a great threat to 
the security and privacy of a networking system. On the other hand, the research on the 
information security in MWNs is very challenging due to their characteristics such as open 
wireless channels, vulnerability of intermediate network nodes, multi-path packet forwarding, 
and various resource constraints. These characteristics make existing information security 
schemes unsuitable for MWNs.  
To provide security and privacy protection for wireless users, also to sweep away the 
obstacles on the way of the wide adoption of emerging wireless technologies, we put our 
research emphasis on security and privacy issues in MWNs. We also take performance 
related issues into consideration since performance issues are also obstacles for MWNs to be 
extensively adopted.  
1.3.2 Contributions 
This thesis aims at developing novel solutions to a number of challenging security issues in 
MWNs. The major contribution of this thesis is summarized as follows.  
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 We identified and summarized the unique information security characteristics of 
MWNs, which distinguish the information security of MWNs from that of other 
networks.  
 We identified the unique features of network coding for the information security of 
MWNs, since network coding is one of the major techniques based on which we 
develop our solutions.  
 We proposed an efficient network coding based privacy preservation scheme against 
traffic analysis and flow tracing in MWNs.  
 We proposed a lightweight scheme to prevent traffic explosion and achieve source 
unobservability in MWNs using network coding.  
 We discussed the information availability in hybrid wireless networks and proposed a 
cooperative peer-to-peer information exchange scheme in network coding enabled 
hybrid wireless networks.  
1.4 Outline of This Thesis 
The remainder of this thesis is organized as follows. 
Chapter 2 gives the general threats to MWNs and the basic requirements of information 
security. We also summarize the characteristics of MWNs and identify challenges to achieve 
information security in MWNs. Then, the network coding model is reviewed, followed by a 
summary.  
In Chapter 3, we propose a novel efficient network coding based privacy-preserving 
scheme against traffic analysis and flow tracing in MWNs. With homomorphic encryption on 
Global Encoding Vectors (GEVs), the proposed scheme offers two significant privacy-
preserving features, packet flow untraceability and message content confidentiality, for 
efficiently thwarting the traffic analysis attacks. Moreover, the proposed scheme keeps the 
random coding feature, and each sink can recover the source packets by inverting the GEVs 
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with a very high probability. Theoretical analysis and simulative evaluation demonstrate the 
validity and efficiency of the proposed scheme.  
Chapter 4 proposes a novel scheme, called SUNC (Source Unobservability using 
Network Coding), to prevent traffic explosion while achieving source unobservability. With 
network coding, specially designed dummy messages can be absorbed at intermediate 
forwarders, and, thus, traffic explosion can be naturally prevented. In addition, SUNC can 
achieve privacy in a stronger threat model. Assisted by homomorphic encryption, SUNC can 
offer forwarder blindness, which is an important privacy property for thwarting internal 
attackers. Security analysis and performance evaluation demonstrate the efficacy and 
efficiency of the proposed SUNC.  
In Chapter 5, we study the issue of scheduling transmission opportunities among nodes 
(peers) to achieve higher network throughput and lower transmission delay for network 
coding enabled wireless networks. By conducting an in-depth investigation on the scheduling 
principles, we propose a cooperative Peer-to-peer Information Exchange (PIE) scheme with 
an efficient and light-weight scheduling algorithm. PIE can not only fully exploit the 
broadcast nature of wireless channels, but also take advantage of cooperative peer-to-peer 
information exchange. Qualitative analysis and extensive simulations demonstrate the 
effectiveness and efficiency of PIE.  






Information Security of MWNs: Threats, Requirements, 
Characteristics, and Challenges 
With the expanding of the Internet and the thriving of various Internet applications, wireless 
networks such as Wi-Fi are widely adopted due to its convenience and low cost. However, 
wireless networks still suffer from their current technical shortcomings such as limited radio 
coverage, low system reliability, as well as lack of security and privacy protection. Multi-hop 
wireless technologies are promising to overcome these shortcomings. The technologies can 
extend the radio coverage by deploying new Access Points (APs) around the existing 
networking infrastructure, which thus can provide Internet access to larger areas. Multi-hop 
wireless technologies can also enhance the robustness and reliability of a wireless network by 
choosing multiple forwarding paths. Due to these benefits, multi-hop wireless technologies 
attract a lot of attention from both academia and industry.  
In this chapter, we first discuss the possible security threats to MWNs, and then give the 
basic requirements of information security. Although similar security and privacy objectives 
have been proposed in existing networking systems, we discuss the difference between the 
information security of MWNs and that of existing networking systems by identifying and 
summarizing the characteristics of MWNs. In addition, we identify the challenges to achieve 
information security in MWNs and propose four research issues related to the information 
security of MWNs. Since our solutions to the proposed issues are based on network coding, 
we give a brief review of the network coding model, followed by a summary.  
2.1 Threats to MWNs 
According to [18], [19], and [20], the possible threats to the information security of MWNs 
can be summarized as follows.  
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 Eavesdropping: Due to the open nature of wireless channels, eavesdropping can be 
easily launched by adversaries without any physical wire tapping. Global 
Eavesdropping is possible since the scale of a MWN may be not large enough or 
many attackers may collude together to launch it.  
 Data Injection/Modification: Open wireless channels have no any obstacles to 
prevent adversaries from injecting data packets. Data modification can also be 
easily done by intercepting data packets first and then injecting them back to the 
wireless network.  
 Node Compromising: Wireless network nodes or mobile stations may be 
compromised more easily than network routers in wired networks. Once a network 
node is compromised, secret information such as various keys may be obtained by 
adversaries. The adversary may stay inside the network node and become an 
internal attacker, which is much more troublesome than outside attackers.  
 Traffic Analysis/Flow Tracing: An advanced attack to compromise user privacy is 
traffic analysis, which can be launched by analyzing the traffic patterns or traffic 
flows between communication parties. Flow tracing attacks can be launched 
through advanced techniques such as time correlation, size correlation, or message 
content correlation. A particular flow tracing attack is the content correlation based 
back-tracing attack, which can be utilized to compromise the location privacy of 
source nodes.  
These threats to MWNs directly lead to the definitions of information security 
requirements, which are discussed in the following section.  
2.2 Information Security Requirements 
Generally, four fundamental requirements are identified for the information security of 




Confidentiality is the term used to describe the property of preserving authorized restrictions 
on access and disclosure for proprietary information. For example, an online banking system 
is required to keep the account number and password of a user secret when the information is 
transmitted from the user to the bank. The system may attempt to enforce confidentiality by 
encrypting the account number and hashing the password, by limiting the places where it 
might appear (in databases, log files, backups, printed receipts, and so on), and by restricting 
access to the places where it is stored. If an unauthorized party obtains the account number 
and password in any way, the confidentiality of the information has been violated.  
There are many forms in which confidentiality can be violated. Confidential information 
displayed on a screen may be peeked; secret data stored in a computer may be stolen; and 
sensitive information transmitted through a channel may be overheard. In this thesis, we 
consider only the situation where confidential information is transmitted through open 
wireless channels. Since the open wireless channels are particularly vulnerable to 
eavesdropping, the confidentiality of sensitive information may face more malicious threats. 
Link-to-link encryption can be applied to wireless channels to ensure the confidentiality of 
sensitive information transmitted through the channels. End-to-end encryption is another 
choice to ensure the confidentiality of information if remote mutual authentication and secret 
key exchange are supported.  
Confidentiality is necessary (but not sufficient) for preserving the privacy of users. We 
will discuss privacy preservation in Section 2.2.4.  
2.2.2 Integrity 
In information security, the property that data cannot be modified without authorization is 
called “integrity”, which is different from the referential integrity in databases. For example, 
we can say that the integrity is breached if a computer is infected and damaged by a virus, if 
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an important data file is deleted accidentally or intentionally, or if some words or values in a 
file are modified.  
Integrity may be breached in many forms with or without malicious intention. The 
address information of a person may be incorrectly typed into a computer system; 
information updates to a database may modify data in a wrong way; and data being 
transmitted in a wireless channel may be altered by an interfering signal. Since wireless 
channels are vulnerable to interference, the data integrity should be appropriately protected. 
The integrity requirement should ensure that messages cannot be altered after the propagation 
through wireless channels. Data integrity can be easily achieved through lightweight hash 
functions or digital signatures.  
2.2.3 Availability 
The term “availability” is used to describe the property of an information system that the 
information must be available when it is needed [17]. In other words, availability means that 
the computing systems used to store and process the information, the security controls used 
to protect it, and the communication channels used to transmit it must be functioning 
correctly. High availability systems aim to remain available at all times, preventing service 
disruptions due to power outages, hardware failures, system upgrades, or channel 
interruptions. Ensuring availability also involves preventing denial-of-service attacks. In this 
thesis, we consider only the situation of service disruption due to channel interruptions.  
2.2.4 Privacy 
The term “privacy” is used to describe the state of preventing unauthorized access and 
disclosure of individual related information. In other words, privacy can be regarded as the 
confidentiality of personal information. In traditional information security system, privacy is 
considered as a part of confidentiality. With the development of the Internet and various 
personal information related applications, privacy issues have gained more and more 
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attentions from both academia and industry. Thus, in this thesis, we emphasize privacy 
protection by separating privacy from confidentiality.  
As far as the information content is concerned, privacy can be classified into the 
following four categories: identity privacy [21], data privacy [22], location privacy [23], and 
activity privacy [24]. Identity privacy is a kind of protection over personal information or 
personally identifiable information (PII) from third parties and possibly also from the other 
parties in communication activities [25]. In other words, identity privacy can be regarded as 
the confidentiality of personal information or personal identifiable information, which is 
directly related to or indirectly derivable to the identity of an individual. According to [26], 
identity privacy can be classified into five levels: pseudonymity, unlinkability, anonymity, 
unobservability, and undetectability.  
Data privacy, also known as content privacy, is a special kind of privacy requirements, 
which is very similar to data confidentiality [27]. Confidentiality usually requires that the 
message content to be kept secret from only the third parties other than the sender and the 
recipient(s). Data privacy is differentiated from confidentiality by posing an additional 
requirement on the details of message content, where the details of message content are kept 
confidential to the recipient(s) instead of only to the third parties. Traditional simple 
encryption methods, no matter whether they are symmetric key encryption or public key 
encryption, are difficult to achieve data privacy. Currently, data privacy is an important 
privacy related research topic.  
Location privacy can be defined as the confidentiality of personal location information 
[28]. Location privacy is another kind of special privacy requirements due to the 
distinctiveness of location information, which can be obtained in many means (direct 
localization, calculation, or eavesdropping). Thus, traditional methods designed for data 
confidentiality cannot protect personal location privacy [29]. As far as the party is concerned, 
location privacy can be divided into two types: source (sender) location privacy or sink 
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(recipient) location privacy. In this thesis, we put our emphasis on the location privacy 
protection.  
Activity privacy, as the name implies, is the privacy preservation on personal activity 
information, such as when and where who makes what actions [30]. Activity privacy is 
usually under the shelter of the former three types of privacy and has received little attention. 
However, the violation of activity privacy may lead to the violation of other types of privacy 
such as identity privacy or location privacy. Activity privacy is very important to privacy 
related applications or real-world business. For example, if the communication activities 
between two companies suddenly increase, the two companies may be negotiating an 
important cooperation or contract. Currently, maybe due to the above-mentioned reasons, 
activity privacy is also receiving more and more attention from both academia and industry.  
The above four types of privacy are not isolated from each other, and, instead, they are 
usually correlated with each other. For example, the breach of activity privacy may disclose 
the identity privacy, and the violation of location privacy combined with on-site observation 
may also disclose the identity privacy. In this sense, privacy preservation is a very 
challenging issue and needs comprehensive consideration from many aspects.  
2.3 Characteristics of MWNs 
In this section, we will discuss and summarize the characteristics of MWNs as follows.  
2.3.1 Open Wireless Channels 
A major characteristic of MWNs is the open nature of wireless channels. Wireless signals are 
broadcast in nature, which allows and attracts a lot of malicious attacks. Compared with 
wired cables, wireless channels make eavesdropping much easier since an adversary does not 
need any special wiretapping tools or doing any wiretapping operations. A common user who 
has a wireless interface can easily eavesdrop to wireless signals being transmitted around. 
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The open wireless channels greatly increase the chance of eavesdropping attacks, which may 
lead to the violation of confidentiality.  
In addition, the open nature of wireless channels allows and induces more active attacks 
such as data injection/modification. Same as the eavesdropping attacks, data 
injection/modification attacks also do not need extra special hardware other than a wireless 
interface. A malicious node can inject a fake packet into a communication flow or modify the 
content of an authentic packet in a flow at any time. These attacks may breach the integrity of 
data and communication flows.  
Furthermore, open wireless channels may incur interference attacks. Different from 
those of the above two types of attacks, the objective of interference attacks is to jam the 
wireless channels and finally achieve the denial of service (DoS) [31]. Interference attacks 
may greatly reduce the availability of the wireless system.  
In summary, open wireless channels allow and induce more passive and active attacks 
such as eavesdropping, data injection/modification, and jamming. These attacks make 
wireless channels more vulnerable to malicious abuse and destruction. In addition, the 
potential profit of these attacks may induce more advanced attack techniques such as flow 
tracing and traffic analysis, which pose severer threats to user privacy.  
2.3.2 Vulnerability of Intermediate Nodes 
Due to the limited effective transmission range of wireless signals, nodes in MWNs are to be 
deployed much denser than nodes in other networks such as wired networks. The denser the 
network nodes, the cheaper each node will be. Due to the practical economic reasons, each 
node may not be powerfully equipped to resist all kinds of attacks. In addition, wireless 
network nodes are usually deployed outside of a building or in a public area, instead of being 
deployed inside a building as wired network nodes. Adversaries can easily get into these 
areas and then launch malicious attacks without the awareness of the administrators or 
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authentic users. All these factors make nodes in MWNs more vulnerable to node 
compromising attacks.  
2.3.3 Multi-path Forwarding 
For local wired networks, a common terminal user can only access the Internet through one 
routing path since the minimum wired cables are supposed to be deployed to save the wiring 
cost. For local MWNs such as community wireless mesh networks, the wiring cost is no 
longer a concern because network nodes are interconnected through wireless signals. In such 
a MWN, packets can be forwarded through multiple routing paths to increase the robustness 
and reliability of the network system [32]. In addition, multi-path packet forwarding can also 
be utilized to balance the network traffic load and to maximize the network throughput.  
2.3.4 Resource Constraints 
As mentioned above, nodes in MWNs are dense and cheap. Especially in asset monitoring 
wireless sensor networks, each node is only a cheap sensor equipped with a wireless 
transceiver. In such MWNs comprised of cheap nodes, various resources such computing 
capability, storage space, power supply, and radio spectrum may become critical constraints. 
Resource constraints are another major concern in the scheme design for information security. 
For example, a cheap sensor may have no sufficient computing capability to perform 
expensive public-key encryption on each message; sensor nodes may also have no enough 
storage space to keep all sensed data; limited power supply from a small battery may also 
require sensor nodes to transmit data as efficient as possible. In addition, resource constraints 
may induce more DoS attacks. Thus, many information security schemes may not be suitable 
for resource-constraint MWNs due to their high computation or transmission overhead, and 
new lightweight schemes need to be explored.  
In summary, these characteristics of MWNs not only pose challenges to security design 
but also bring opportunities to solve these information security issues from a new perspective. 
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For example, the multi-path packet forwarding can help to enhance the robustness and 
reliability of a MWN. In the following section, we will specifically explore the research 
challenges of information security in MWNs.  
2.4 Identified Research Challenges 
Nowadays, a common user can be very powerful with its ability to access the Internet. 
Distributed computing services such as grid computing can provide a common user with a 
tremendous computing capability; search engines, e.g., google and baidu, can provide a 
common user with the ability to access enormous data and documents. A single attacker can 
also utilize these services to equip itself into a powerful and intelligent adversary, and it is 
becoming more and more difficult to defend against these adversaries. 
In this section, we present several identified research challenges of information security 
in MWNs. Some of them such as traffic analysis attacks and internal adversaries have 
already been identified in traditional wired networks, but they may pose new threats to or 
exhibit new behaviors in MWNs. Some of them such as traffic explosion which may lead to 
DoS are newly found in MWNs.  
2.4.1 Thwarting Traffic Analysis Attacks 
Traffic analysis attacks [33] have already been identified in traditional wired networks, but 
they pose much severer threats to newly emerging MWNs. Wiretapping in traditional wired 
networks is not as easy as eavesdropping in wireless networks, and special hardware is 
required for the attacks. The easiness of eavesdropping induces much more traffic analysis 
attacks, posing severer threats to wireless networks, especially MWNs.  
Traffic analysis attacks have many forms such as flow tracing, rate monitoring, etc, and 
flow tracing is one of the critical attacks related to MWNs. Flow tracing has two types, 
forward tracing and back tracing, which are used to compromise sink privacy and source 
privacy, respectively. Flow tracing can be performed based on advanced techniques such as 
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time correlation, size correlation, or message content correlation. In time correlation, for 
example, the attacker may observe the time order of incoming and outgoing packets and 
attempt to correlate them together to deduce the forwarding paths. These advanced flow 
tracing techniques pose great challenges to thwarting traffic analysis attacks in MWNs.  
2.4.2 Thwarting Internal Adversaries 
As discussed in 2.3.2, intermediate network nodes in MWNs are vulnerable to node 
compromising attacks due to many practical reasons such as transmission range, node density, 
and product cost. If an intermediate network node is compromised, the attacker may stay 
inside the node and become an internal adversary. An internal adversary may have obtained 
the secret keys stored at the node and have acquired the full control of the node, making it 
very challenging to thwart internal adversaries from compromising user privacy. Link-to-link 
encryption can not preserve user privacy since the secret keys have already been 
compromised; end-to-end encryption, no matter whether it is symmetric-key or public-key 
encryption, can not prevent adversaries from tracing to source or sink nodes since message 
ciphtertext may be correlated to deduce the forwarding paths. Traditional methods can not 
preserve user privacy, and new schemes are required for the information security of MWNs.  
2.4.3 Preventing Traffic Explosion 
As shown in [26], dummy messages are usually employed to achieve event source 
unobservability, which is a very attractive and desirable privacy objective. However, dummy 
messages may lead to a severe issue, traffic explosion, which can greatly degrade the 
performance of a networking system. Traffic explosion is not only a performance issue but 
also an information security issue since the availability of a networking system may be 
breached by the DoS due to traffic explosion. Preventing traffic explosion and at the same 
time achieving source unobservability is a very challenging issue.  
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2.4.4 Trade-off between Security and Performance 
MWNs will certainly extend the radio coverage range and at the same time attract more users. 
To support more users, various network resources, such as computing capability and 
transmission bandwidth, may become a performance bottleneck. The consideration for 
performance requirements [34] makes it inevitable for researcher and designer to face the 
tradeoff between security and performance. In some cases, the performance must be 
sacrificed to satisfy a security requirement; in other cases, a strict security requirement can be 
loosened a little to trade for a great improvement in performance. Our design principle is to 
maximize the performance after satisfying the predefined security requirements. Even with 
this design principle, it is still very challenging to make a tradeoff between security and 
performance in a complex real-world situation.  
2.5 Preliminaries 
Most of our solutions for the above research challenges are based on the newly-emerging 
network coding technologies [35]. Thus, it is necessary to give a brief introduction to the 
network coding model. Homomorphic Encryption Functions (HEFs) are also introduced in 
this part.  
2.5.1 Network Coding 
Unlike other packet-forwarding systems, network coding allows intermediate nodes to 
perform computation on incoming messages, making outgoing messages be the mixture of 
incoming ones. This elegant principle implies a plethora of surprising opportunities, such as 
random coding [36]. As shown in Figure 2.1, an outgoing packet is formed by taking a 
random combination of packets in the current incoming buffer.  
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5, 5, 6 Global Encoding Vector  
Figure 2.1: Random Coding (Mixing) at Intermediate Nodes 
An overview of network coding and possible applications has been given in [37], and 
packet tagging and buffering are key techniques for practical network coding [38]. Packet 
tagging will be introduced later. In practical network coding, source information should be 
divided into blocks with h packets in each block. All coded packets related to the kth block 
belong to generation k and random coding is performed only among the packets in the same 
generation. Packets within a generation need to be synchronized by buffering for the purpose 
of network coding at intermediate nodes.  
Consider an acyclic network (V, E, c) with unit capacity, i.e., c(e)=1 for all e E∈ , 
meaning that each edge can carry one symbol per unit time, where V is the node set and E is 
the edge set. Assume that each symbol is an element of a finite field qF . Consider a network 
scenario with multicast sessions, where a session is comprised of one source s V∈  and a set 
of sinks T V⊆  (or one single sink t V∈ ). Let ( , )h MinCut s T=  be the multicast capacity, 
and 1, , hx x  be the h symbols to be delivered from s to T. 
For each outgoing edge e of a node v, let ( ) qy e ∈F  denote the symbol carried on e, 
which can be computed as a linear combination of the symbols ( ')y e  on the incoming edges 
'e  of node v, i.e., '''( ) ( ) ( )eey e e y eβ=∑ . The coefficient vector '( ) [ ( )]ee eβ=β  is called 
Local Encoding Vector (LEV). 
By induction, the symbol ( )y e  on any edge e E∈  can be computed as a linear 
combination of the source symbols 1, , hx x , i.e., 1( ) ( )
h
i ii
y e g e x
=
=∑ . The coefficients form 
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a Global Encoding Vector (GEV) 1( ) [ ( ),..., ( )]he g e g e=g , which can be computed 
recursively as ''( ) ( ) ( ')eee e eβ=∑g g , using the LEVs ( )eβ . The GEV ( )eg  represents the 
code symbol ( )y e  in terms of the source symbols 1, , hx x . 
Suppose that a sink t T∈  receives symbols 1( ), , ( )hy e y e , which can be expressed in 
terms of the source symbols as 
 
1 1 1 1 1 1
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( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
h
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, (2.1) 
where Gt is called Global Encoding Matrix (GEM) and the ith row of Gt is the GEV 
associated with ( )iy e . Further, sink t can recover the h source symbols by inverting the 
matrix Gt and applying the inverse to 1( ), , ( )hy e y e .  
In general, each packet can be considered as a vector of symbols 
1( ) [ ( ), , ( )]Ne y e y e=y . By likewise grouping the source symbols into packets 
,1 ,[ , , ]i i i Nx x=x , the above algebraic relationships carry over to packets. To facilitate the 
decoding at the sinks, each message should be tagged with its GEV ( )eg , which can be 
easily achieved by prefixing the ith source packet ix  with the ith unit vector iu . Then, each 
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. (2.2) 
The benefit of tags is that the GEVs can be found within the packets themselves, so that 
the sinks can compute Gt without knowing the network topology or packet-forwarding paths. 
Nor is a side channel required for the communication of Gt. Actually, the network can be 
dynamic, with nodes and edges being added or removed in an ad hoc way. The coding 
arguments can be time varying and random.  
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2.5.2 Homomorphic Encryption Functions 
Homomorphic Encryption Functions (HEFs) have the property of homomorphism, which 
means operations on plaintext can be performed by operating on corresponding ciphertext. If 
( )E ⋅  is a HEF, ( )E x y+  can be computed from ( )E x  and ( )E y  without knowing the 
corresponding plaintext x and y. To be applicable in the proposed scheme, a HEF ( )E ⋅  needs 
to satisfy the following properties: 
1) Additivity: Given the ciphertext ( )E x  and ( )E y , there exists a computationally 
efficient algorithm ( , )Add ⋅ ⋅  such that ( ) ( ( ), ( ))E x y Add E x E y+ = .  
2) Scalar Multiplicativity: Given ( )E x  and a scalar t, there exists a computationally 
efficient algorithm ( , )Mul ⋅ ⋅  such that ( ) ( ( ), )E x t Mul E x t⋅ = .  
Actually, the scalar multiplicativity can be deduced from the additivity, since 
1
( ) ( )t
i
E x t E x
=
⋅ = ∑ . Benaloh [39] and Paillier [40] cryptosystems are of such an additive 
HEF, where the addition on plaintext can be achieved by performing a multiplicative 
operation on the corresponding ciphertext, i.e., 1 2 1 2( ) ( ) ( )E x x E x E x+ = ⋅ . Further, the 
following two equations can be easily derived:  
 ( ) ( )
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In this chapter, we have discussed the threats, requirements, and characteristics related to the 
information security of MWNs. We also present four research challenges, followed by the 





Network Coding Based Privacy Preservation against Traffic 
Analysis in Multi-hop Wireless Networks 
In this chapter, we propose a novel network coding based privacy-preserving scheme against 
traffic analysis in MWNs. As we have discussed before, wireless access networks, such as 
Wi-Fi, have been widely deployed due to their convenience, portability, and low cost. 
However, they still suffer from inherent shortcomings such as limited radio coverage, poor 
system reliability, as well as lack of security and privacy preservation. Multi-hop Wireless 
Networks (MWNs) are regarded as a highly promising solution for extending the radio 
coverage range of the existing wireless networks, and they can also be used to improve the 
system reliability through multi-path packet forwarding. However, due to the open wireless 
medium, MWNs are susceptible to various attacks, such as eavesdropping, data 
modification/injection, and node compromising. These attacks may breach the security of 
MWNs, including confidentiality, integrity, and authenticity. In addition, some advanced 
attacks, such as traffic analysis and flow tracing, can also be launched by a malicious 
adversary to compromise users’ privacy, including source anonymity and traffic secrecy. In 
this chapter, we focus on the privacy issue, i.e., how to prevent traffic analysis/flow tracing 
and achieve source anonymity in MWNs.  
Among all privacy properties, source anonymity is of special interest in MWNs. Source 
anonymity refers to communicating through a network without revealing the identity or 
location of source nodes. Preventing traffic analysis/flow tracing and provisioning source 
anonymity are critical for privacy-aware MWNs, such as wireless sensor or tactical networks. 
Consider a simple example of multicast communication in military ad hoc networks (which 
can be regarded as a kind of MWNs), where nodes can communicate with each other through 
multi-hop packet forwarding. If an attacker can intercept packets and trace back to the source 
through traffic analysis, it may disclose some sensitive information such as the location of 
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critical nodes (e.g., the commanders) and then further it may impair the location privacy. 
Subsequently, the attacker can take a series of actions to launch the so-called Decapitation 
Strike to destroy these critical nodes [11], as shown in Figure 3.1 (A). Another example is the 
event reporting in wireless sensor networks, where flow tracing can help attackers to identify 
the location of concerned events, e.g., the appearance of an endangered animal in a 
monitored area, and then take subsequent actions to capture or kill the animals [41], as shown 
in Figure 3.1 (B).  
 
Figure 3.1: Privacy Threats in MWNs 
How to efficiently thwart traffic analysis/flow tracing attacks and provide privacy 
protection in MWNs is a very challenging issue. Existing privacy-preserving solutions, such 
as proxy-based schemes [42], [43], Chaum’s mix-based schemes [44], [45], and onion-based 
schemes [46], [47], may either require a series of trusted forwarding proxies or result in 
severe performance degradation in practice. Different from previous research, our study 
examines the privacy issue from a brand-new perspective: using network coding to achieve 
privacy preservation.  
Network coding was first introduced by Ahlswede et al [48]. Subsequently, two key 
techniques, random coding [36] and linear coding [49], further promoted the development of 
network coding technologies. The random coding makes network coding more practical, 
while the linear coding is proven to be sufficient and computationally efficient for network 
coding. Currently, network coding has been widely recognized as a promising information 
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dissemination approach to improve network performance. Primary applications of network 
coding include file distribution and multimedia streaming on P2P overlay networks [50], data 
transmission in sensor networks [51], tactical communications in military networks [52], etc. 
Compared with conventional packet forwarding technologies, network coding offers, by 
allowing and encouraging coding/mixing operations at intermediate forwarders [48], several 
significant advantages such as potential throughput improvement [53], transmission energy 
minimization [54], and delay reduction [37]. In addition, network coding can also work as an 
erasure coding scheme to enhance the dependability of a distributed data storage system [55].  
The deployment of network coding in MWNs can not only bring the above performance 
benefits, but also provide a feasible way to efficiently thwart the traffic analysis/flow tracing 
attacks since the coding/mixing operation is encouraged at intermediate nodes. Similar to 
Chaum’s mix-based schemes [44], [45], network coding provides an intrinsic message 
mixing mechanism, which implies that privacy preservation may be efficiently achieved in a 
distributed manner. Moreover, the unlinkability between incoming packets and outgoing 
packets, which is an important privacy property for preventing traffic analysis/flow tracing, 
can be achieved by mixing the incoming packets at intermediate nodes. However, the privacy 
offered by such a mixing feature is still vulnerable, since the linear dependence between 
outgoing and incoming packets can be easily analyzed. A simple deployment of network 
coding cannot prevent traffic analysis/flow tracing since the explicit Global Encoding 
Vectors (GEVs, also known as tags) prefixed to the encoded messages provide a back door 
for adversaries to compromise the privacy of users. Once enough packets are collected, 
adversaries can easily recover the original packets and then conduct the traffic analysis/flow 
tracing attacks based on these original packets. A naïve solution to address this vulnerability 
is to employ link-to-link encryption. This method can prevent traffic analysis to a certain 
degree, but it introduces very heavy computational overhead and thus results in significant 
performance degradation of the whole network system. Additionally, it cannot preserve the 
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privacy of users once some intermediate nodes are compromised by adversaries. Such 
deficiencies motivate us to explore an efficient privacy-preserving scheme for MWNs.  
In this chapter, based on network coding and Homomorphic Encryption Functions 
(HEFs) [39], [40], we propose an efficient privacy-preserving scheme for MWNs. Our 
objective is to achieve source anonymity by preventing traffic analysis and flow tracing. To 
the best of our knowledge, this is the first research effort in utilizing network coding to 
thwart traffic analysis/flow tracing and realize privacy preservation. The proposed scheme 
offers the following attractive features: 1) Enhanced Privacy against traffic analysis and 
flow tracing. With the employment of HEFs, the confidentiality of GEVs is effectively 
guaranteed, making it difficult for attackers to recover the plaintext of GEVs. Even if some 
intermediate nodes are compromised, the adversaries still cannot decrypt the GEVs, since 
only the sinks know the decryption key. Further, the confidentiality of GEVs brings an 
implicative benefit, i.e., the confidentiality of message content [57], because message 
decoding only relies on GEVs. On the other hand, with random recoding on encrypted GEVs, 
the coding/mixing feature of network coding can be exploited in a natural manner to satisfy 
the mixing requirements of privacy preservation against traffic analysis; 2) Efficiency. Due 
to the Homomorphism of HEFs, message recoding at intermediate nodes can be directly 
performed on encrypted GEVs and encoded messages, without knowing the decryption keys 
or performing expensive decryption operations on each incoming packet. The performance 
evaluation on computational complexity demonstrates the efficiency of the proposed scheme; 
and 3) High Invertible Probability. Random network coding is feasible only if the prefixed 
GEVs are invertible with a high probability. Theoretical analysis demonstrates that the 
influence of HEFs on the invertible probability of GEVs is negligible. Thus, the random 
coding feature can be kept in our network coding based privacy-preserving scheme.  
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.1 gives the threat 
models. In Section 3.2, the proposed privacy-preserving scheme is presented in detail. In 
Sections 3.3 and 3.4, security analysis and performance evaluation/optimization are 
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conducted, respectively. In Section 3.5, related work is surveyed, followed by a summary in 
Section 3.6.  
3.1 Threat Models 
In this chapter, we consider the following two attack models. 
 
Figure 3.2: Attack Model: (a) Outside Attacker, (b) Inside Attacker 
Outside Attacker: An outside attacker can be considered as a global passive 
eavesdropper who has the ability to observe all network links, as shown in Figure 3.2 (a). An 
outside attacker can examine the tags and message content, and thus link outgoing packets 
with incoming packets. Further, even if end-to-end encryption is applied to messages at a 
higher layer, it is still possible for a global outside attacker to trace packets by analyzing and 
comparing the message ciphertext.  
Inside attacker: An inside attacker may compromise several intermediate nodes, as 
shown in Figure 3.2 (b). Link-to-link encryption is vulnerable to inside attackers since they 
may already have obtained the decryption keys and thus the message plaintext can be easily 
recovered.  
Both inside and outside attackers may perform more advanced traffic analysis/flow 
tracing techniques, including size correlation, time correlation, and message content 
correlation [58]. Adversaries can further explore these techniques to deduce the forwarding 
paths [41] and thus to compromise user privacy. 
Without loss of generality, we assume that an anonymous secure routing protocol [11] is 
deployed to assist network nodes to determine forwarding paths. The generation number of a 
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packet can be hidden in the secure routing scheme so that an attacker cannot find the 
generation of a packet for its further analysis. 
3.2 Network Coding Based Privacy-Preserving Scheme for MWNs 
In this section, we propose a novel network coding based privacy-preserving scheme for 
MWNs, which can efficiently thwart traffic analysis and flow tracing attacks, followed by 
theoretical analysis on the invertibility of GEMs. 
3.2.1 The Proposed Privacy-Preserving Scheme 
Though providing an intrinsic mixing mechanism, the original network coding cannot 
provide privacy guarantee due to explicit GEVs, since an adversary can recover the original 
messages as long as enough packets are collected. Link-to-link encryption is vulnerable to 
inside attackers since they may already have compromised several intermediate nodes and 
obtained the secret keys.  
An intuitive way to resolve this issue is to keep GEVs confidential to intermediate nodes 
by encrypting the GEVs in an end-to-end manner, which can prevent compromised 
intermediate nodes from analyzing GEVs or recovering the original messages. Such an 
intuitive approach, however, cannot prevent the adversaries from tracking the message 
ciphertext since the “mixing” feature of network coding may be disabled by the end-to-end 
encryption.  
To address this issue, we employ the Paillier cryptosystem [40] as the HEF to apply 
encryption to GEVs, since protecting GEVs is generally sufficient to ensure confidentiality 
network coded message content [57]. HEF can not only keep the confidentiality of GEVs, but 
also enable intermediate nodes to efficiently mix the coded messages. In the Paillier 
cryptosystem, given a message m and the public key (n, g), the encryption function is 
described as follows, 
 2( ) (mod )m nE m g r n= ⋅ , (3.1) 
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where r is a random factor in the Paillier cryptosystem. ( )E m  satisfies the following 
homomorphic property: 
 1 2 21 2 1 2 1 2( ) ( ) ( ) (mod ) ( )
m m nE m E m g r r n E m m+⋅ = ⋅ = + . (3.2) 
With HEFs, intermediate nodes are allowed to directly perform linear coding/mixing 
operations on the coded messages and encrypted tags, as shown in Figure 3.3. In other words, 
due to the homomorphism of the HEF, one can achieve linear network coding by operating 
on encoded messages and encrypted GEVs, without knowing the decryption keys or 
performing the decryption operations.  
 
Figure 3.3: Homomorphic Encryption on Packet Tags 
The proposed scheme primarily consists of three phases: source encoding, intermediate 
recoding, and sink decoding. Without loss of generality, we assume that each sink acquires 
two keys, the encryption key ek and the decryption key dk, from an offline Trust Authority 
(TA), and the encryption key ek is published to all other nodes. For supporting multicast, a 
group of sinks are required to obtain from the TA or negotiate the key pair in advance [59]; 
then, they can publish the encryption key and keep the decryption key private in the group.  
 
Figure 3.4: Packet Tagging before Source Encoding 
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Source Encoding: Consider that a source has h  messages, say 1, , hx x , to be sent out. 
The source first prefixes h  unit vectors to the h  messages, respectively, as illustrated in 
Figure 3.4. After tagging, the source can choose a random LEV and perform linear encoding 
on these messages. Then, a LEV can produce an encoded message with the GEV (which is 
equal to the LEV temporarily) tagged.  




( ) ( ( )), (1 )
( ) [ ( ), ( ), , ( )]
i ek i
h
c e E g e i h




where the notation ek denotes the encryption key. Notice that we apply HEF to GEVs after 
(instead of before) linear encoding. We will discuss this strategy in Section 3.3 from the 
perspective of both the security and performance.  
Intermediate Recoding: After receiving a number of packets of the same generation, 
an intermediate node can perform random linear coding on these packets. To generate an 
outgoing packet, firstly, a random LEV [ ]1, , hβ β  is chosen independently; then, a linear 
combination of message content of the incoming packets is computed as the message content 
of the outgoing packet, as shown in Figure 2.1.  
Since the tags of the h incoming packets are in ciphertext format, and an intermediate 
node has no knowledge of the corresponding decryption keys, it is difficult for the 
intermediate node to perform functions such as earliest decoding to get the original message 
content. However, due to the homomorphism of the encryption function, a linear 
transformation can be directly performed on the encrypted tags of the incoming packets to 
generate a new tag for the outgoing packet, namely,  
 
1
( ) ( ) ( ' )h i iig e e g eβ==∑ . (3.4) 
The GEV of a new outgoing packet can be calculated according to equation (7). By 
utilizing the homomorphic characteristic of the encryption on GEVs, the ciphertext of the 
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The ciphertext of new GEVs can be computed from the ciphertext of GEVs of incoming 
packets without the knowledge of the decryption key. Finally, the ciphertext of a new GEV is 
prefixed to the corresponding message content to form a new outgoing packet, which is sent 
out to downstream nodes.  
Sink Decoding: After receiving a packet, the sink first decrypts the packet tag using the 
corresponding decryption key dk. 
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Once enough packets are received, a sink can decode the packets to get the original 
messages. Then, the sink derives the decoding vector, which is the inverse of the GEM, as 
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For random network coding, a key issue is the invertibility of a GEM. We discuss in 
detail the invertibility of a GEM as follows. 
3.2.2 Invertibility of a GEM 
Let GEM A be comprised of h GEVs with h elements in each GEV. A  and *A  are the 
determinant and the adjoint of the matrix A, respectively. According to the theory of linear 
algebra, finding the inverse of a square matrix A is equivalent to solving the corresponding 
 
 34 
system of linear equation with A being the coefficient matrix. Gaussian elimination can be 
applied to solve a system of linear congruence equations. Due to the homomorphism of the 
modulo congruence in terms of the addition, subtraction, and multiplication operations, a 
system of linear congruence equations can be separated into several single equations with 
one unknown in each equation as follows:  
 
1
( 1) (mod )h i ji j ijjA x y M n
+
=
= −∑ . (3.9) 
A system of linear congruence equations is solvable if and only if every independent 
equation is solvable. The difference between solving a system of linear equations and solving 
a system of linear congruence equations lies in finding the inverse of |A| modulo n. In order 
to further discuss the solutions, we formulate the linear congruence equations as follows: 
 (mod ) ( 1, , )i iA x A n i h= = , (3.10) 
where 
1
( 1) (mod )h i ji j ijjA y M n
+
=
= −∑ . 
Theorem 1: A system of linear congruence equations has a unique solution only if 
0A ≠ . 
Proof: From the theory of modulo congruence, for 1n > , the mapping : nf  is a 
homomorphic mapping in terms of the addition, subtraction, and multiplication operations. 
Therefore, for each solution to (mod )i iA x A n= , there must be one or more solutions to 
( )i iA x A k n k= + ⋅ ∈ . 
According to the theory of linear algebra, the necessary and sufficient condition for 
( )i iA x A k n k= + ⋅ ∈  to have a unique solution is 0A ≠ . Thus, the necessary condition 
for a system of linear congruence equations to have a unique solution is 0A ≠ . ■ 
 
However, this condition is not sufficient for a system of linear congruence equations to 
have a unique solution, because a solution for i iA x A=  does not imply a corresponding 
solution for (mod )i iA x A n= . 
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where gcd( , )d A n= . 
Proof: According to Theorem 1, 0A ≠  is a necessary condition for a system of linear 
congruence equations to have a unique solution. Therefore, the original system of linear 
congruence equations can be transformed to (mod )( 1, 2, , )i iA x A n i h= =  by only 
applying addition and multiplication operations, which are preserved by the homomorphic 
mapping : nf . 
In equations (mod )i iA x A n= , variables ( 1, 2, , )ix i h=  can be solved independently 
by employing the theory of linear congruence equations. A linear congruence equation 
(mod )ax b n=  is solvable if and only if the congruence 0(mod )b d= with gcd( , )d a n= is 
solvable, where gcd( , )a n  is the greatest common divisor of a and n. Let one solution to the 
linear congruence equation be 0 /x n d< . Then, the solutions are 
0 0 0, / , , ( 1) /x x x n d x d n d= + + − . If 1d = , there is only one unique solution which is less 
than n. According to the theory of linear congruence equations, if 
0(mod ) ( 1, 2, , )iA d i h≡ = , every equation (mod )i iA x A n=  has d solutions. The 
solutions to a system of linear congruence equations are the combinations of these 
independent solutions. The combination number is hd . ■ 
 










and 1 (mod ) ( 1, 2, , )i ix A A n i h
−= = .  
Proof: From Theorem 2, if gcd( , ) 1d A n= = , a system of linear congruence equations 
has 1hd =  solution, which is the unique solution to the system. In addition, according to the 
congruence theory, when gcd( , ) 1A n = , the modular inverse of the integer A , which is 
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denoted as 1A − , can be calculated using the extended Euclidean algorithm. The result 
satisfies the following equation: 1 1(mod )A A n− = . The unique solution to a system of linear 
congruence equations is 1 (mod )i ix A A n
−= ( 1,2, , )i h= . The solution can also be 
expressed in a matrix form as 1 1 * (mod )A A X X A A Y n− −= = .  ■ 
 
Theorem 2 and Corollary 1 indicate that a solvable system of linear congruence 
equations does not imply the invertibility of the corresponding coefficient matrix. A stronger 
condition, i.e., gcd( , ) 1A n = , is required for the invertibility of  a coefficient matrix A 
modulo n. The above theorems and corollary generally hold whether n takes the value of a 
prime number q or the product of two prime numbers p and q. In section 3.4, we will further 
give a quantitative analysis on the invertible probability of a coefficient matrix.  
3.3 Security Analysis 
The proposed scheme can provide privacy preservation by means of resisting traffic 
analysis/flow tracing attacks such as size correlation, time correlation, and message content 
correlation. Size correlation can be naturally prevented since each message is trimmed to be 
of the same length in network coding based schemes. Time correlation can be effectively 
resisted by the inherent buffering technique [37] of network coding. Let the time length of 
buffering periods be Tb and the average arrival rate of coded packets be λ . The time 
correlation attack can succeed only when exactly one packet arrives in the buffering period 
Tb, since zero packets make the attack meaningless and more than one packet can induce the 
“mixing” operation, making time correlation useless. If coded packets arrive following the 
Poisson distribution, the probability of a successful time correlation attack can be given as 
follows: 
 Pr(1, ) bTb bT T e
λλ λ − ⋅⋅ = ⋅ ⋅ . (3.13) 
From Eq. (3.13), it can be seen that the probability decreases exponentially with the time 
period Tb. On the other hand, the transmission delay increases linearly with the time period 
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Tb. In practice, we can adaptively adjust parameter Tb according to the security and delay 
requirements. 
Message content correlation can be resisted by the “mixing” feature of network coding. 
With the assistance of HEF, GEVs are kept confidential to eavesdroppers, making it difficult 
for adversaries to perform linear analysis on GEVs. In addition, HEF keeps the random 
coding feature, making the linear analysis on message content almost computationally 
impossible. Let the number of intercepted packets be w. The computational complexity for 
attackers to examine if a packet is a linear combination of h messages is 3( )h h l+ ⋅O  in terms 
of multiplication. Thus, the computational complexity to analyze the intercepted w packets is 
3( ( ))hwO C h h l+ ⋅ , which increases exponentially with w, as shown in Figure 3.5. Compared to 
the conventional network coding with explicit GEVs, the proposed scheme significantly 
enhances privacy so that the traffic analysis attacks are almost computationally impossible. 



































Figure 3.5: Privacy Enhancement in terms of Computational Complexity (h=5, l=200) 
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In the source encoding phase, we apply HEFs to GEVs after (instead of before) linear 
encoding. From security perspective, this choice is more secure since independent random 
factors can be chosen for each encryption operation; these random factors can bring more 
randomness to the ciphertext of GEVs and make content correlation more difficult. From 
performance perspective, it is argued that source encoding may be more lightweight if HEFs 
are applied before linear coding and independent random factors are only chosen for different 
GEV elements. This argument is not proper since, for each new GEV element, linear coding 
after encryption requires averagely about h exponentiations and h-1 multiplications, which 
are computationally much more expensive than those of linear coding before encryption 
(which requires 2 exponentiations and 1 multiplication).  
3.4 Performance Evaluation and Optimization 
In this section, we evaluate the performance of the proposed scheme in terms of invertible 
probability and computational overhead. A performance optimization framework is also 
developed to minimize the statistical computational overhead. 
3.4.1 Invertible Probability 
Let each element of a LEV be randomly chosen from a field qF . The following two theorems 
hold. 
Theorem 3: For a Local Encoding Matrix (LEM), which is comprised of h LEVs with h 
elements in each LEV and each element is from the finite field qF , the invertible probability 
of a GEM (also with h vectors) is degraded by 
1
(1 )h iq is q
−
=
= −∏ . 
Proof: The invertibility factor of h LEVs depends only on the linear dependence of the 
h LEVs themselves. Firstly, the elements in the first LEV can be any combinations except for 
all zeros. Therefore, the invertibility factor of the first LEV is 1 hq−− . The second LEV 
should be linearly independent on the first one, where the all-zero vector is also excluded; 
thus, the invertibility factor of the second LEV is 11 / 1h hq q q −− = − . The third LEV should 
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be linearly independent on the former two; thus, the invertibility factor is 2 21 / 1h hq q q −− = − . 
Similarly, for the remaining LEVs, the invertibility factors are 31 hq −− , 41 hq −− , , 11 q−− , 
respectively. Therefore, the overall invertibility factor of the whole LEM is the product of 
these individual factors: 
1
(1 )h iq is q
−
=
= −∏ .  ■ 
 
Corollary 2: The invertibility factor qs  of an h×h LEM can be approximated to 
1 21 q q− −− −  when 4h ≥ , and the error of this approximation is within the magnitude of 
5( )q−O . 
This corollary can be easily proven by expanding the multiplication of the polynomials. 
This corollary gives two important implications. Firstly, in practical network coding, the 
min-cut capacity h is much larger than the condition in corollary 2 and, thus, this corollary 
can be safely used. Secondly, the field size q is relatively a large number. Therefore, an 
amount in the magnitude 5( )q−O  is very small and can be omitted. Based on Theorem 3 and 
Corollary 2, the invertible probability of a GEM can be easily calculated. For a network 
coding system with a min-cut capacity ( 4)h h ≥ , the invertible probability can be 
approximated as 1 2(1 )tq q− −− − , where q is the field size and t is the total coding time from 
the source to sinks. In practical network coding, since q is a relatively large prime number, 
the above invertible probability can be further approximated to 11 tq−− . 
Theorem 3 does not apply to the Paillier cryptosystem, since elements in the 
cryptosystem are chosen from a ring nR (another algebraic structure), where n pq=  and p, q 
are two prime numbers.  
Theorem 4: For a LEM (comprised of h LEVs), where the elements are randomly 
chosen from a ring nR ( n pq= ), the invertible probability of a GEM (also with h vectors) is 
degraded by p q ns s s+ − . 
Proof: The problem can be decomposed into two separate sub-problems in terms of the 
prime numbers p and q, respectively. As for the sub-problem in terms of p, there is a 
mapping from the original problem to the problem modulo p. According to Theorem 3, the 
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invertibility factor is 
1
(1 )h ip is p
−
=
= −∏ . Similarly, the invertibility factor of the sub-problem 
in terms of q is 
1
(1 )h iq is q
−
=
= −∏ . The above two sub-problems have overlap, which occurs 
at these points where the number is congruent to zero modulo n. The invertibility factor 
related to the overlap area is 
1
(1 )h in is n
−
=
= −∏ . According to the union principle of the set 
theory, the overall invertibility factor is: 1 ((1 ) (1 ) (1 ))p q n p q ns s s s s s− − + − − − = + − . ■ 
 
If p q≈ , the integral invertibility factor can be approximately reduced  to 1 11 p q− −− − , 
with the error confined in 2 2( )p q− −+O . If a session performs totally t times of random 
coding, the invertible probability of GEVs at sinks is 1 1(1 )tp q− −− − . Since p and q are 
relatively large prime numbers in practical network coding, the invertible probability can be 
approximately reduced to 1 11 ( )t p q− −− + . It can be seen that the invertible probability is 
dependent on the random coding times, instead of the number of sinks.  


























Figure 3.6: Invertible Probability vs. Field Size 
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We compare the invertible probability of the proposed scheme with those of the random 
coding schemes in [36] and [49], as shown in Figure 3.6. It can be seen that the invertible 
probability of the proposed scheme is similar to those of the random coding schemes, 
however, the proposed scheme can offer significant privacy enhancement, which is very 
critical in practical applications. In addition, Figure 3.7 shows the invertible probability 
decreases with the increase of the random coding time, and the simulation results match the 
analytical results very well, thus demonstrating the validity of the performance analysis. 
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Figure 3.7: Invertible Probability vs. Total Times of Random Coding (p=241, q=251) 
3.4.2 Computational Overhead 
The computational overhead of the proposed scheme can be investigated respectively from 
three aspects: source encoding, intermediate recoding, and sink decoding. Since the 
computational overhead of the proposed scheme is closely related to the specific 
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homomorphic encryption algorithm, in the following analysis, we will take the Paillier 
cryptosystem as the encryption method when necessary.  
Source Encoding Overhead: Consider h GEVs with h elements in each GEV, which 
form an h×h GEM. After source encoding, every element in the GEM is encrypted one by 
one. Thus, the computational overhead is O(h2) in terms of encryption operations. Every 
encryption operation requires 2 exponentiations, 1 multiplication, and 1 modulus operation in 
the Paillier cryptosystem. Therefore, the computational complexity is 2( log )h n⋅O  in terms 
of multiplication operations.  
Intermediate Recoding Overhead: In intermediate nodes, linear transformation on the 
elements of GEVs can be performed only by manipulating the ciphertext of these elements 
because intermediate nodes have no knowledge of decryption keys. According to Eq. (3.8), 
the computational complexity of producing one element in new GEVs is h exponentiations 
and 1h −  multiplications on the ciphertext, which is ( log )h n⋅O  in terms of multiplications 
together. Thus, the computational complexity is 2( log )h n⋅O  for a GEV and 3( log )h n⋅O  for 
a GEM with h GEVs in terms of multiplication. 
Sink Decoding Overhead: After receiving an encoded message, a sink can decrypt the 
elements in the GEV. According to the Paillier cryptosystem, decrypting an element requires 
1 exponentiation, 1 multiplication, and 1 division operation. Therefore, the computational 
complexity of decrypting a GEV is ( log )h n⋅O  in terms of multiplication operations. Thus, 
for a whole GEM with h GEVs, the computational overhead is 2( log )h n⋅O  in terms of 
multiplication.  
3.4.3 Performance Optimization 
As described in the previous subsections, the invertible probability and computational 
overhead of the proposed scheme are 1 11 ( )t p q− −− +  and 3( log )h n⋅O , respectively. Thus, 
the statistical computational overhead for a GEM can be expressed in terms of 














From Eq. (3.14), we can see that the computational overhead of the proposed scheme is 
a monotonically increasing function of h, i.e., the length of a GEV, for any given n and t. As 
discussed in Section 3.3, the security of the proposed scheme is also monotonically 
increasing with the increase of h. Thus, a tradeoff between the security and the computational 
overhead should be considered in practical deployment. A typical way to deal with this 
tradeoff is to set the security requirements first and then choose the minimum h to meet the 
requirements. In this way, the minimum computational overhead can be achieved.  
On the other hand, noticing that n pq=  and p q≈ , we can approximate Eq. (3.14) for 
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, we have: 
2 2
1 4 ( 1/ 2 )n t LambertW e t= − ⋅  and 
2 2
2 4 (1/ 2 )n t LambertW e t= ⋅ . Since the Lambert-W 
function has infinite branches in the complex plane, we only consider the branches which 
have real-valued solutions with real arguments. In addition, since 1t ≥  (t is the total coding 
time) and the Lambert-W function is single-valued in the real plane for a positive argument, 
we can determine that 2 2 22 4 (1/ 2 ) 1/n t e t e< ⋅ ⋅ = , which is in conflict with the condition 
4n ≥ . Thus, 2n  can be excluded for further consideration. 
1n  is double-valued in the real plane since the argument of the function LambertW(x), 
1/ 2x e t= − ⋅ , is in the region of ( 1/ , 0)e− . We denote the double-valued results as  
 2 21( , ) 4 ( , 1/ 2 ) , 1,0n k t t LambertW k e t k= − ⋅ = − , (3.16) 
where k can be any integer in the complex plane. For a real-valued solution of 1n , k can only 
be 0 and -1. Similarly, we can determine that 1 1 1(0, ) (0, ) 0.215tn t n t =< =  and this principal 
value does not accord with the prescribed condition 4n ≥ . Finally, we can determine by 
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checking that the result 1( 1, )n t−  is the point where the objective function ( , )g n t  achieves its 
minimum for any given parameter t. For example, given 5t = , we can get three real-valued 















where only 1( 1,5)n −  meets the prescribed condition 4n ≥ . Figure 3.8 shows the 
computational overhead versus the size of algebraic structure. 
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Figure 3.8: Computational Overhead vs. Size of Algebraic Structure (t=5) 
After obtaining the minimum point 1( 1, )n t− of the objective function, we can find the 
closest positive integer n which is the product of two primes p and q, i.e., n pq= . The 




3.5 Related Work 
Several privacy-preserving schemes have been proposed, and they can be classified into three 
categories: proxy-based, mix-based, and onion-based. Proxy-based schemes include Crowds 
[42] and Hordes [43]. The common characteristic of these schemes is that they all employ 
one or more network nodes to issue service requests on behalf of the originator. In Crowds, 
for example, servers and even crowd members cannot distinguish the originator of a service 
request, since it is equally likely originating from any member of the crowd.  
Chaum’s mix based schemes include MorphMix [44] and Mixminion [45]. These 
schemes commonly apply techniques such as shaping, which divides messages into a number 
of fixed-sized chunks, and mixing, which caches incoming messages and then forwards them 
in a randomized order. These two techniques can be used to prevent attacks such as size 
correlation and time correlation.  
Onion-based schemes include Onion Routing [46] and Onion Ring [47]. The common 
feature of these schemes is the chaining technique, which chains onion routers together to 
forward messages hop by hop to the intended recipient. The characteristic of this technique is 
that every intermediate onion router knows only about the router directly in front of and 
behind itself, respectively, which can protect user privacy if one or even several intermediate 
onion routers are compromised.  
Network coding has privacy-preserving features, such as shaping, buffering, and mixing. 
However, network coding suffers from two primary types of attacks, pollution attacks [60] 
and entropy attacks [61]. Pollution attacks can be launched by untrusted nodes or adversaries 
through injecting polluted messages or modifying disseminated messages, which is fatal to 
the whole network due to the rapid propagation of pollution. In entropy attacks, adversaries 
forge non-innovative packets that are linear combinations of “stale” ones, thus reducing the 
overall network throughput.  
To secure network coding, some solutions have been proposed and they can be 
classified into two categories according to different theoretical bases. Information-theory 
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based schemes [52] can detect or filter out polluted messages only at sinks, not at forwarders. 
Cryptography-based solutions include homomorphic hashing [61], homomorphic signatures 
[60], and secure random checksum [61]. These solutions either require an extra secure 
channel [61], or incur high computation overhead [60].  
In summary, existing studies on secure network coding mainly focus on detecting or 
filtering out polluted messages [60]. Homomorphic cryptosystems are utilized to produce 
homomorphic signatures for the purpose of protecting the integrity of messages, which is 
substantially different from the objective of this research; in this research, we utilize 
homomorphic encryption functions in homomorphic cryptosystems to offer the 
confidentiality for GEVs; in this way, the proposed scheme can provide the packet flow 
untraceability and message content confidentiality, and finally achieves our privacy objective, 
source anonymity. Little attention has been paid to the privacy issues, especially to protecting 
the encoded messages from tracking or traffic analysis. 
3.6 Summary 
In this chapter, we have proposed an efficient network coding based privacy-preserving 
scheme against traffic analysis and flow tracing in multi-hop wireless networks. With the 
light-weight homomorphic encryption on Global Encoding Vectors (GEVs), the proposed 
scheme offers two significant privacy-preserving features, packet flow untraceability and 
message content confidentiality, which can efficiently thwart traffic analysis/flow tracing 
attacks. Moreover, with homomorphic encryption, the proposed scheme keeps the essence of 
random linear network coding, and each sink can recover the source messages by inverting 
the GEVs with a very high probability. The quantitative analysis and simulative evaluation 
on privacy enhancement and computational overhead demonstrate the effectiveness and 





Preventing Traffic Explosion and Achieving Source Unobservability 
in Multi-hop Wireless Networks using Network Coding 
In this chapter, we focus on preventing traffic explosion to ensure system availability while 
achieving the privacy objective of source unobservability in MWNs at the same time. As 
mentioned above, multi-hop wireless networks (MWNs) are very attractive and promising in 
many application scenarios, such as wireless sensor networks, military ad hoc networks, and 
wireless mesh networks. However, most of these application scenarios are security/privacy-
sensitive. For example, a generic asset monitoring application, which is also called the 
Panda-Hunter Game [9], is susceptible to the leakage of source location privacy since it may 
lead to the loss of monitored assets. Another example is the command communication in 
military ad hoc networks, where an attacker may utilize back-tracing techniques to obtain the 
location information of critical nodes (e.g., the commanders) and then launch the so-called 
Decapitation Strike to destroy those critical nodes [11].  
For those privacy-sensitive application scenarios, source unobservability is an attractive 
and desirable privacy property. Unobservability is the state of items of interest (IOIs) being 
indistinguishable from any other IOI of the same type [26]. Compared with anonymity, 
unobservability is a stronger privacy objective since, with respect to the same attacker, 
unobservability reveals always only a subset of the information that anonymity reveals. 
Specially, source unobservability means that it is not noticeable whether or not any source 
node transmits. It is very challenging to achieve source unobservability in MWNs. Most 
existing privacy-preserving solutions [42]-[47] are not designed for MWNs and can offer 
only a relatively weak privacy protection, such as anonymity or pseudonymity. Only a few 
schemes can achieve source unobservability by using dummy messages.  
Shao et al propose a scheme called FitProbRate by utilizing dummy messages to 




anonymity in [41]. FitProbRate can prevent global external attackers from conducting time 
correlation/rate monitoring attacks, but it cannot thwart message content correlation based 
traffic analysis or flow tracing even if messages are encrypted in an end-to-end manner [62]. 
If assisted by link-to-link encryption on each-hop transmission, FitProbRate can prevent 
external attackers from successfully launching these two attacks. However, this scheme is 
still vulnerable to internal attackers since they may have the access to secret keys. More 
importantly, FitProbRate has not taken into consideration the problem of the explosion of 
network traffic, which may lead to severe performance degradation or even service denial.  
Yang et al propose two schemes, PFS (Proxy-based Filtering Scheme) and TFS (Tree-
based Filtering Scheme), to prevent the explosion of network traffic while achieving source 
unobservability [63]. However, both the schemes rely on trusted sensor proxies to proactively 
filter dummy messages, making those proxies become performance bottlenecks and privacy-
critical nodes. In other words, if a proxy node is compromised, all sensor nodes in its 
proximity will suffer privacy leakage. Such deficiencies in existing schemes motivate us to 
explore a more secure and more efficient privacy-preserving scheme to prevent the explosion 
of network traffic while achieving source unobservability.  
Generally, if we use dummy messages to achieve source unobservability, it is argued 
that there is no way to filter dummy messages while preventing internal attackers at proxy 
nodes. The statement seems plausible since proxy nodes must be able to distinguish dummy 
messages from real ones to selectively drop dummy messages for the prevention of traffic 
explosion. The ability of proxy nodes may be utilized by the internal attackers to identify and 
track real messages for compromising source privacy.  
We investigate the traffic explosion problem from a brand-new perspective. Instead of 
filtering or dropping dummy messages at trusted sensor proxies, we utilize network coding to 
absorb dummy messages at intermediate forwarders. To the best of our knowledge, this is the 
first research on how to utilize network coding to prevent the explosion of network traffic. 




coding principles to produce coded outgoing packets. In this way, dummy messages can be 
absorbed automatically by network coding at intermediate forwarders.  
Network coding was first introduced by Ahlswede et al [48] and has been widely 
recognized as a promising information dissemination approach. Compared with conventional 
packet forwarding technologies, network coding allows coding/mixing operations at 
intermediate forwarders [48] and, thus, offers several significant advantages such as potential 
throughput improvement [53], transmission energy minimization [54], and delay 
minimization [37]. Network coding can also work as an erasure coding scheme to enhance 
the dependability of a distributed data storage system [55].  
The deployment of network coding in MWNs can not only bring the above performance 
benefits, but also provide a possible way to efficiently prevent the explosion of network 
traffic while achieving source unobservability. Since coding operation is encouraged at 
intermediate forwarders, dummy messages can be combined with real ones and, thus, be 
absorbed into real traffic. In this way, internal attackers can be naturally thwarted since there 
is no necessity for intermediate forwarders to distinguish and drop dummy messages. 
However, all dummy messages cannot be combined into real traffic. An arbitrary dummy 
message may destroy coded packets when combined with them, leaving no way to recover 
real messages. Thus, only specially designed dummy messages can be used for the purpose 
of network coding and, further, can be absorbed by network coding.  
In this chapter, we propose a privacy-preserving scheme, SUNC (Source 
Unobservability using Network Coding), which can prevent the explosion of network traffic 
while achieving source unobservability. With specially designed dummy messages, SUNC 
has the following three attractive properties.  
1) Preventing Traffic Explosion: According to the network coding principle, SUNC 
can combine dummy messages with real ones at intermediate forwarders. With specially 
designed dummy messages, the combination can only be related to the real messages. We 




designed dummy messages. With this property, dummy messages do not destroy real 
messages when combined with them. In this way, dummy messages can be absorbed by 
network coding at intermediate forwarders; thus, the explosion of network traffic can be 
naturally prevented.  
2) Source Unobservability: SUNC is based on network coding. As we know from 
Chapter 3, SUNC has many attractive privacy-preserving characteristics, such as shaping, 
buffering, and mixing. Shaping can resist size correlation attacks, buffering can resist time 
correlation attacks, and mixing can resist content correlation attacks. These three 
characteristics together offer unlinkability between incoming and outgoing packets. 
Unlinkability is a critical privacy feature for thwarting traffic analysis/flow tracing attacks 
and achieving source anonymity. According to [26], unobservability can be achieved when a 
mechanism used to achieve anonymity is appropriately combined with dummy traffic. Thus, 
by utilizing dummy messages, SUNC can achieve source unobservability.  
3) Forwarder Blindness: Since dummy messages are absorbed by network coding, 
there is no need for intermediate forwarders to distinguish dummy messages from real ones. 
Thus, forwarders can be designed to be unaware of the authenticity of a message. We call 
this property “forwarder blindness”, which means that a forwarder cannot distinguish dummy 
messages from real ones. The “forwarder blindness” property is attractive since, even if all 
forwarders are compromised, adversaries still cannot tell the authenticity of a message and, 
therefore, cannot compromise source unobservability. In SUNC, we utilize homomorphic 
encryption functions to provide forwarder blindness.  
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.1 gives the threat 
models. In Section 4.2, the proposed privacy-preserving scheme is presented in detail. 
Security analysis and performance evaluation are given in Section 4.3 and 4.4, respectively, 




4.1 Threat Models 
















Figure 4.1: Attack Model: External Attacker and Internal Attacker 
External Attacker: An external attacker can be a global passive eavesdropper who has 
the ability to observe all network links, as shown in Figure 4.1. An external attacker can 
examine the tags and message content, and, thus, link outgoing packets with incoming ones. 
Further, even if messages are encrypted in an end-to-end manner, it is still possible for a 
global external attacker to trace packets by analyzing and comparing the message ciphertext.  
Internal attacker: An internal attacker may compromise many intermediate nodes 
(excluding source and sink nodes), as shown in Figure 4.1. Link-to-link encryption is 
vulnerable to internal attackers since they may already have obtained the decryption keys, 
and, thus, the message plaintext may be easily recovered for analysis.  
Both internal and external attackers may perform more advanced traffic analysis/flow 
tracing techniques, including size correlation, time correlation/rate monitoring, and message 
content correlation [58]. Thus, they can further explore these techniques to deduce the 
forwarding paths [41], and then back-trace to the source node. 
4.2 The Proposed Privacy-Preserving Scheme 
In this section, we propose a novel privacy-preserving scheme (SUNC) for MWNs to prevent 




network coding scheme [64], SUNC can be divided into four functional modules: 
parameter setting, generating dummy traffic, embedding real traffic, and recovering real 
messages. 
4.2.1 Parameter Setting 
Since random coding can only be performed on the packets in the same generation, the 
generation management is the first issue to be addressed. In this study, we utilize a coarse 
synchronization mechanism [65] to determine the generation number of a packet. Each node 
can be equipped with a low-cost timer, and the time is divided into fixed time slots. All 
messages, no matter whether they are real or dummy, sent out in a time slot belong to the 
same generation, and each message is prefixed with the corresponding generation number for 
further recoding at intermediate forwarders.  
Similar to the research in Chapter 3, we choose the Paillier cryptosystem as the HEF for 
SUNC. In the Paillier cryptosystem [40], given a message m and the public/encryption key (n, 
g), the encryption function can be expressed as follows,  
 2( ) (mod )m nE m g r n= ⋅  (4.1) 
where *nr∈Z  is a random factor. The Paillier cryptosystem can keep the random coding 
feature of SUNC, since 
 1 2 21 2 1 2 1 2( ) ( ) ( ) (mod ) ( )
m m nE m E m g r r n E m m+⋅ = ⋅ = + . (4.2) 
In addition, the random factor r in the Paillier cryptosystem can be employed to generate 
random dummy messages of nullity, which can be achieved by setting m to be zero.  
For a unicast application, e.g., the endangered animal monitoring in wireless sensor 
networks, the sink node is preloaded with a decryption/private key dk, and the corresponding 
encryption/public key ek is published to all other nodes. For a multicast application, e.g., the 
command communication in military ad hoc networks, each sink node in a multicast session 
is preloaded with a same decryption key dk, and the corresponding encryption key is 




4.2.2 Generating Dummy Traffic 
Since network coding and dummy traffic are employed to provide source unobservability, 
how to generate dummy messages and how to send out them are critical. Several schemes, 
such as ConstRate [66] [67], ProbRate [63], and FitProbRate [41], have already been 
proposed for sending out dummy messages to thwart rate monitoring attack. Here, we focus 
on how to generate dummy messages. 
In SUNC, dummy messages should have the following three properties: homomorphism, 
randomness, and dummy nullity. Since messages in plaintext are easy to analyze, we make 
dummy messages in SUNC always appear in their ciphertext format. Thus, homomorphism is 
the first requirement for the possibility of coding through operating the ciphertext directly. 
Secondly, dummy messages should have randomness for thwarting content correlation 
attacks even if they are designed to appear only in their ciphertext format; because if 
attackers can track dummy messages, real messages can be easily exposed. Thirdly, to thwart 
internal attackers, the authenticity of a message is concealed from intermediate nodes. For an 
intermediate node to conduct random coding operations on the authenticity-unknown 
messages, the property of dummy nullity is required. Only with dummy nullity, dummy 
messages can be combined with real ones without destroying the coded packets; real 
messages can be kept mint in coded packets and, finally, be recovered intact from the coded 
packets. Dummy nullity can be implemented through, when a dummy message is generated, 
setting the message plaintext to be null.  
Let the dimension of GEVs be h and the length of real messages be l in terms of 
codewords. Dummy messages should have the same length as a tagged real message, i.e., h+l. 













The former h codewords can be regarded as the GEV of this dummy message, while the 
latter l codewords can be regarded as the content of this dummy message.  
The steps to generate a real message are the same as those shown in Algorithm 1 except 
that the codewords of real messages are used instead of a zero vector. The former h 
codewords are the GEV (normally a unit vector) prefixed to this real message and the latter l 
codewords are the content of the real message, as shown in Eq. (4.3). 
 1 1( , ) ( , , , , , )h lg g x x= =m g x  (4.3) 
How to determine the dimension h of GEVs and choose a GEV is a critical performance 
issue, which will be discussed in Section 4.4. Notice that real messages also have the former 
two properties, i.e., homomorphism and randomness, but they do not have the third property, 
dummy nullity.  
4.2.3 Embedding Real Traffic 
According to the rate control policies in [66] [67] [63] [41], a node needs to send out dummy 
or real messages at the intervals of a specified probability distribution. If a node has not 
received any message from its neighbors, it sends out a dummy message, which can be 
generated according to Algorithm 1. If the node has already received several messages from 
its neighbors, it can compute the outgoing message from those incoming ones according to 
the principles of random linear network coding. Real messages, if exist, are thus embedded 
into the traffic flow in the network.  
Algorithm 1: Generating Dummy Traffic 
Input: the length of a dummy message h+l; 
Output: a dummy message c. 
Procedure GDT: 
1. choose h+l random factors 1( , , )h lr r +  from *nZ ; 
2. calculate dummy codewords of nullity by letting mj = 0: 
2 2




j ek j m r r j jd E m g r n r n= == = ⋅ = ; 
3. unite jd  to form a dummy message 1( , , )h ld d + ; 




For the sake of presentation, we define a message as: 
 2(mod )nig n= ⋅i
m
ic r , (4.4) 
where mi is a vector of codewords representing the message plaintext, and ri is a vector of 
random factors. For a real message, the corresponding mi is not a null vector; while for any 
dummy message, the corresponding mi is a null vector.  
Algorithm 2 shows the procedure of embedding real traffic, if there is, into dummy 
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β=∑ im m and iiβ=∏
i
r r , we get 
 2(mod )n= g n⋅mc r . (4.6) 
From Eq. (4.6), the outgoing message is actually the ciphertext of message m, which is a 
linear combination of those incoming messages mi. This computation is feasible ascribing to 
the homomorphism of the Paillier cryptosystem.  
If all ci’s are dummy messages, all corresponding mi’s are null vectors; the procedure in 
algorithm 2 mixes all the incoming dummy messages together to produce a new outgoing 
dummy message, since the outgoing message plaintext is ii β=∑ im m = 0 . Otherwise, the 
Algorithm 2: Embedding Real Traffic 
Input: incoming messages ci’s; 
Output: an outgoing message c. 
Procedure ERT: 
1. choose a random factor 2*i nβ ∈Z  for each ci ; 
2. calculate the outgoing message c: 
2(mod )i nβ∏ i
i
c = c ; 




outgoing message plaintext is actually a linear combination of those incoming real 
messages mi, since for those incoming dummy messages, im = 0 .  
Notice that a node can execute Algorithm 2 without knowing the authenticity of an 
incoming packet; neither does it know the authenticity of the outgoing packet. This so-called 
forwarder blindness is really attractive and beneficial to privacy protection. Only the source 
node knows the authenticity of a message; the sink node will know it after applying the 
decryption operation on the message. We will have a detailed discussion in Section 4.3 about 
the impacts of these precious properties to system security.  
4.2.4 Recovering Real Messages 
After receiving a message, which is in its ciphertext format, a sink node can decrypt it to get 
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If the received message is a dummy message, the decrypted message plaintext mi is a 
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After collecting enough (typically h) coded messages, the sink node can find the inverse 
matrix of the prefixed GEVs in those coded messages, as shown in Eq. (4.8), and then apply 
the inverse matrix to the coded messages to recover the original messages, as shown in Eq. 
(4.9). 
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In SUNC, due to the existence of dummy messages, the GEM is probably invertible if 
the number of received GEVs is no less than the rank of the GEM. In other words, if the 
number of received non-dummy messages is not less than the number of detected real events, 
the original real messages are probably able to be recovered. A critical performance issue is 
the invertible probability of the GEVs. We will discuss in Section 4.4 on how to analyze and 
enhance the invertible probability.  
4.3 Security Analysis 
In this section, we will discuss the security properties of SUNC, i.e., what kind of objectives 
can be achieved, what kind of adversaries can be thwarted, what kind of attacks can be 
prevented, and how well the privacy protection can be provided. 
4.3.1 Information Security and Privacy 
SUNC can prevent the explosion of network traffic while providing source unobservability 
for privacy-sensitive MWNs, such as asset monitoring wireless sensor network [9] and 
military ad hoc networks [11]. Specially, the precious privacy property of source 
unobservability provided by SUNC relies on the following features.  
Availability: The explosion of network traffic is almost an inevitable subsequence of 
using dummy traffic to achieve source unobservability. Traffic explosion may lead to severe 
performance degradation or even service denial and greatly affect the availability of the 
communication system. To guarantee the availability of the applications, the explosion of 
network traffic must be prevented. SUNC utilizes network coding to absorb specially 
designed dummy messages at intermediate forwarders. In this way, network traffic is made 
under a full control, traffic explosion can be naturally prevented, and, thus, the availability 
can be guaranteed.  
Source Unobservability: SUNC is based on network coding, and the inherent mixing 




possibility of linear analysis on incoming and outgoing messages. Packet unlinkability can 
effectively prevent attacks such as back-tracing, and, thus, can help SUNC to achieve source 
anonymity. When combined with dummy messages, SUNC can achieve provide source 
unobservability [26].  
Forwarder Blindness: Intermediate nodes may be compromised, and adversaries may 
reside in the nodes to become an internal attacker. To prevent the possible privacy leakage at 
intermediate nodes, SUNC provides the message authenticity blindness to those intermediate 
forwarders by employing the public-key HEF of the Paillier cryptosystem. In SUNC, 
forwarders can blindly conduct coding operations on messages without knowing the 
decryption keys or performing the expensive decryption operations; neither are they required 
to know the authenticity of a message, since they do not need to discard the dummy 
messages. Through network coding, dummy messages are automatically absorbed at 
intermediate forwarders with only the random factors included into the newly coded 
messages. With forwarder blindness, the privacy leakage at intermediate nodes can be 
effectively prevented, and SUNC can resist internal attackers.  
In summary, preventing traffic explosion helps to guarantee the availability of the 
communication system, source unobservability is achieved by utilizing network coding and 
dummy messages, and forwarder blindness is provided by HEFs. The three information 
security and privacy features together assist SUNC to successfully achieve its final objectives: 
providing communication service without privacy leakage. In addition, according to [26], the 
source unobservability is a very strong privacy feature and implies a lot of privacy properties, 
such as source anonymity, relation unobservability, source undetectability, etc.  
4.3.2 Adversaries and Attacks 
SUNC can prevent global external attackers, since external attackers can neither directly 
determine the authenticity of a message directly nor find the possibility for a message to be 




because internal attackers at intermediate forwarders do not have decryption keys, and 
neither can they link incoming and outgoing packets together.  
As described above, some rate control schemes, such as ConstRate [67], ProbRate [63], 
and FitProbRate [41], can be employed in combination with SUNC. Thus, the rate 
monitoring attack can be effectively resisted since adversaries cannot distinguish the real 
source from dummy sources through statistically monitoring their data rates.  
Traffic analysis and flow tracing attacks can also be effectively resisted since the mixing 
feature of network coding is extensively exploited and packet unlinkability is achieved 
against not only global external attackers but also internal attackers. Specially, the 
commonly-used techniques of traffic analysis and flow tracing attacks, such as size 
correlation, time correlation, and message content correlation, are effectively prevented: size 
correlation becomes useless in network coding based system since each packet in the system 
is chopped of the same length; time correlation is statistically thwarted due to the existence 
of buffering and rate control; message content correlation is completely disabled by the 
mixing feature of network coding combined with HEFs.  
Another typical attack, called message content based back-tracing attack, is also 
effectively prevented by SUNC. Message content based back-tracing attack is conducted by 
comparing message content no matter whether it is in plaintext or ciphertext format, and 
tracing messages up to several hops to distinguish real messages from dummy ones, since 
dummy messages are usually discarded after one hop transmission while real messages will 
probably be forwarded hop-by-hop to its destination. Once a real message is distinguished 
from dummy ones, the corresponding source node may be easily revealed by tracing the 
message backward to the originator. This attack is quite dangerous to some existing schemes 
[41], while SUNC can effectively resist this attack since the mixing feature of network 
coding is extensively exploited and the packet unlinkability is achieved especially against 




4.4 Performance Evaluation 
In this section, we will conduct performance analysis and evaluation on SUNC in terms of 
invertible probability of GEVs, communication efficiency, and computational overhead. 
Moreover, the linear dependence of received GEVs is also extensively analyzed since it is 
closely related to the computational overhead of message recovering at sink node.  
4.4.1 Invertible Probability 
Generally, the invertible probability of GEVs is closely related to three parameters: the size 
of algebraic structure n, the dimension of GEVs h, and the total times of random coding t [36] 
[49]. The results on invertible probability achieved in [56] are still applicable to SUNC. 
According to Corollary 2 in [56], for example, the influence of changing h on invertible 
probability is confined within the magnitude of 5( )n−O  when 4h ≥ and, thus, can be 
neglected.  
However, some other factors need to be considered. A significant factor is the real 
traffic rate of a node. Consider an event reporting wireless sensor network [41] with a 
deterministic GEV management policy, i.e., each node in the network being assigned a 
specific codeword in GEVs. 
As we know, SUNC is a multi-source network coding scheme [64], and generations of 
packets are divided according to the specified time slots. Let the real traffic rate of a node be 
λ  messages per second, and the specified time slots be of the length 1/ μ  seconds. If 
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where DF means the degrading factor of invertible probability. If ProbRate [63] or 
FitProbRate [41] is employed, the degrading factor is  
 /(1 / ) uProbRateDF u e




































Figure 4.2: Degrading Factor of Invertible Probability vs. /λ μ  
The analytical results are plotted in Figure 4.2. It can be seen that ConstRate 
outperforms ProbRate and FitProbRate in terms of invertible probability when / 1.4uλ < , 
while otherwise ConstRate performs worse than them. Normally, high invertible probability 
is preferred; thus, the condition / 1.4uλ <  is inclined to be satisfied.  
For practical applications, several methods can be employed to improve the invertible 
probability. From Figure 4.2, reducing the value of / uλ  can increase the invertible 
probability. To achieve this goal, we can set a larger value for parameter μ  or discard some 
real messages to reduce λ .  
4.4.2 Communication Efficiency 
In SUNC, the communication traffic is relatively steady, since dummy messages will be 
produced and sent out if no real events are detected. Thus, the actual communication 
efficiency depends on the practical demands. However, practical demands cannot be satisfied 




The upper bound can be calculated independently by three steps. The first step is 
called encryption efficiency Ee. In the Paillier cryptosystem, each codeword is expanded 
from nZ  to 2
*
n
Z  after encryption, doubling the message length. Thus, the encryption 
efficiency Ee is 1/2. The second step is called tagging efficiency Et. As indicated in SUNC, 
the tagging efficiency Et can be calculated as / ( )tE l h l= + . In other words, the tagging 
overhead is (1 ) / /t t tO E E h l= − = . The third step is called dummy efficiency Ed. The 
dummy efficiency Ed can be bounded as d iiE R r≤ ∑sink , where Rsink  is the message arrival 
rate of sink node, and ri is the message departure rate of node i. In summary, the overall 
communication efficiency Ec can be calculated as follows: 
 
/ 2( )
c e t d
ii
E E E E
l R h l r
= ⋅ ⋅
= ⋅ + ⋅∑sink
. (4.12) 
4.4.3 Computational Overhead 
The computational overhead of SUNC can be investigated respectively from the following 
four aspects: generating dummy traffic, generating real traffic, embedding real traffic, and 
recovering real traffic.  
Generating Dummy Traffic: According to Algorithm 1, generating a dummy message 
requires ( )h l+  exponentiation operations and ( )h l+ modulus operations, which is 
equivalent to 2( ) logh l n+ ⋅  multiplication operations. Fortunately, dummy messages can be 
generated offline, and no online computational overhead is required.  
Generating Real Traffic: According to Algorithm 1 and Eq. (4.3), generating a real 
message requires ( )h l+  encryption operations, which is equivalent to 2 ( )h l⋅ +  
exponentiations, ( )h l+ multiplications and ( )h l+ modulus operations. Considering the GEV 
is normally a unit vector, we can reduce the number of exponentiations to ( 2 )h l+ ⋅ , in which 
( )h l+  exponentiations can be calculated offline and the other l exponentiations must be 
computed online. Thus, the overall computational overhead is 2( ) logh l n+ ⋅  online and 




Embedding Real Traffic: Let the number of incoming messages in a generation be θ , 
which is closely related to the sending rates of source nodes. According to Algorithm 2, 
generating an outgoing message requires ( )h l θ+ ⋅  exponentiation operations, ( ) ( 1)h l θ+ ⋅ −  
multiplications, and ( )h l+  modulus operations. In practice, almost all these operations can 
be performed offline. Thus, the computational overhead is 2( ) logh l nθ+ ⋅ ⋅  offline 
multiplications.  
Recovering Real Traffic: According to Eq. (4.7), the computational overhead to decrypt 
a message is ( )h l+  exponentiations, ( )h l+  divisions, ( )h l+  multiplications, ( )h l+  
subtractions, and 2 ( )h l⋅ +  modulus operations. Thus, the overall computational overhead to 
decrypt a message is 2( ) logh l n+ ⋅  multiplications.  
Notice that for applications such as the event reporting wireless sensor networks, the 
real traffic is pretty sparse and many received messages are actually dummy messages. A 
dummy message can be discerned through decrypting and checking if the prefixed GEV, i.e., 
the former h codewords, is a null vector. Thus, the corresponding computational overhead 
can be reduced to 2logh n⋅  multiplications.  
For a real message, we can analyze the linear dependence of this message on other 
received messages immediately after decrypting the prefixed GEV, since the linear 
dependence among these messages only relies on their GEVs. If a real message is dependent 
on other received messages, it is not necessary to decrypt the latter l codewords, since this 
message has no innovation and the whole message can be discarded. The computational 
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Figure 4.3: Linear Dependence Analysis 
Linear dependence analysis can be conducted based on the Gaussian Elimination 
method. Generally speaking, the coefficients above the leading coefficient in each row 
cannot be guaranteed to be zeros in the row echelon form of GEVs; however, we can extend 
the general Gaussian Elimination method to uniform those coefficients as follows. Let the 
number of real events be s, and the number of real messages that arrived at the sink node be v. 
When another message arrives, linear dependence between the message and the v buffered 
messages can be bounded according to the following steps.  
Step 1 is to eliminate the first v codewords of the newly arrived message, which can be 
done by multiplying the corresponding row vector by a corresponding value, and then 
subtracting the result from the codeword vector of the newly arrived message. For example, 
to eliminate the first codeword, we multiply the first vector by the value of the first codeword, 
and then subtract the result from the vector of the newly arrived message, as shown in Figure 
4.3. This step requires ( )v s v⋅ −  multiplications (we do not calculate subtractions here).  
If the newly arrived message turns into a zero vector after the step 1, it is linearly 
dependent upon the buffered messages. Thus, it has no innovation to the sink node and can 
be discarded immediately. Otherwise, we will continue to change the messages into row 




done by multiplying its inverse. This step requires 1 inversion and ( 1)s v− −  
multiplications. Step 3 is to eliminate the (v+1)th codewords of buffered messages. The 
operations are similar to those in step 1. The difference is that in step 3, the codewords from 
different buffered messages are eliminated. This step requires ( 1)v s v⋅ − − multiplications.  
In summary, for a newly arrived message which is linearly dependent on buffered 
messages, the computational overhead to determine the linear dependence is ( )v s v⋅ −  
multiplications; for a message which is linearly independent on buffered messages, the 
computational overhead is 1 inversion and ( ) ( 1)( 1)v s v v s v− + + − −  multiplications. If 
letting w s v= − , we get 
 ( , ) ( 1) ( 1)v w v w v wδ = ⋅ + + ⋅ − , (4.13) 
where ( , )v wδ  denotes the number of multiplications required for analyzing the (v+1)th real 
message. 
If all messages at the sink node are linearly independent messages, we have 
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 (4.14) 
where ( , )v wΔ  is the total number of multiplications required after v real messages are 
received. Thus, the total number of multiplication required for analyzing all messages is  
 2
1
( ,0) 2 ( ) ( 1) / 3s
v
s v s v s s
=
Δ = ⋅ ⋅ − = ⋅ −∑ . (4.15) 
In practice, however, many messages are linearly dependent messages. Let the number 
of linearly dependent messages be k when the sink node has v messages. We have 
 ( 1, 1) ( , ) ( , ) ( )v w v w v w k v s vδΔ + − = Δ + + ⋅ ⋅ − , (4.16) 
where k is a random variable independent of v if the arrival of real events is a Poisson process. 
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, (4.17) 
where k  is the average value of k, λ  is the arrival rate of real events, and μ  is the arrival 




It is well known that the inversion process can be done by extend the GEM with an 
augmented unit matrix. Thus, the computational overhead of decoding and recovering 
original messages is 3( )sO , which is much less than that of conventional decoding 
operations in network coding, 3( )hO , when real events are sparse, since 3 3( ) ( )s hO O  
when s h< .  
 
Figure 4.4: The Average Complexity of Linear Dependence Analysis 
Notice that in SUNC the arrival of real events is sparse and distributed, making the 
arrival of innovative packets at the sink sparse and distributed too. Thus, the received GEVs 
usually form a matrix in reduced row echelon form, which greatly reduces the complexity of 
linear dependence analysis on GEVs. For example, if received GEVs naturally exhibit a 
reduced row echelon form, the linear independence of them can be determined immediately 
by observing the matrix form, without inducing any computational overhead.  
Since the echelon form of GEM is closely related to the complexity of linear 
dependence analysis, we simulate the process of real event arrival and message sending as a 
queuing model shown in Figure 4.4. From the model, we can derive the average 
computational complexity as: 
 
1
( ( ) ( )) ( )se i i ii C q k D q P q=Δ = + ⋅ ⋅∑ , (4.18) 
where Pi(q) is the probability for the queue length being q in time slot i, Ci(q) and Di(q) are 
the computational overhead of handling an innovative and a non-innovative message, 
respectively, both in terms of multiplications. Following the above analysis steps, we can get: 














If ConstRate [66] is adopted as the rate control, we can get: 
 /( ) ( / ) / !qiP q e q
λ μλ μ −= ⋅ . (4.21) 
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 (4.22) 
If ProbRate [63] or FitProbRate [41] is employed, we get: 
 ( ) (1 / ) ( / )qiP q λ μ λ μ= − ⋅ . (4.23) 












The average computational overhead of linear dependence analysis in the above two 
cases is plotted in Figure 4.5. It can be seen that the average computational overheads both 
increase with the ratio of λ  and μ , and that of ConstRate increases much slower than that of 




























Figure 4.5: Average Computational Overhead 
In summary, the average computational overhead of linear dependence analysis is 
coarsely given in Eq. (4.17); if ConstRate is chosen, the average computational overhead of 
linear dependence analysis is refined in Eq. (4.22); if ProbRate or FitProbRate is chosen, the 
average computational overhead is given in Eq. (4.24), all in terms of multiplications. From 
Eq. (4.22) and (4.24), it can be seen that both average computational overhead is linear to the 
number of real events s, meaning that the average computational overhead is far below the 
worst case. 
4.5 Summary 
In this chapter, we have proposed a privacy-preserving scheme, called SUNC, to prevent 
traffic explosion while achieving source unobservability. Dummy messages which are used 
for privacy preservation can be absorbed by network coding at intermediate forwarders, and, 




coding helps to offer source anonymity, which can yield source unobservability when 
combined with dummy messages. In addition, assisted by homomorphic encryption functions, 
SUNC exhibits several attractive features such as forwarder blindness. With this feature, 






Cooperative Peer-to-Peer Information Exchange in Network Coding 
Enabled Wireless Networks 
In this chapter, we emphasize how to enhance the data availability among peers if the remote 
base station is temporarily unavailable, and propose a cooperative peer-to-peer information 
exchange scheme based on network coding. Network coding has been widely recognized as a 
promising information dissemination approach to improving network performance [48] by 
allowing and encouraging coding operations at intermediate forwarders. Primary applications 
of network coding include file distribution [68] and multimedia streaming [50] in peer-to-
peer (P2P) overlay networks, data persistence in sensor networks [69], and information 
delivery in wireless networks [70]. Incorporation of network coding into these applications 
brings many benefits such as throughput improvement [37], energy efficiency [71], and delay 
minimization [72].  
Network coding can be employed to solve the Cooperative Peer-to-peer Repair (CPR) 
problem [73], where centralized and distributed CPR algorithms are proposed based on 
observed heuristics. The heuristics reflect some intuitive superficies instead of the essences 
of network coding based information exchange. In addition, the undetermined parameters in 
CPR algorithms constitute another open issue: how to tune them to adapt the scheduling 
algorithms. Such deficiencies motivate us to explore a more insightful scheme to maximize 
wireless coding gain, i.e., the benefit of combining network coding and wireless broadcast 
[70].  
The scheduling issue in the CPR problem can be reduced to a peer scheduling issue by 
making nodes (peers) send coded packets which are combinations of all packets in a node 
[68]. Specifically, the peer scheduling issue is about how to intelligently schedule the 
transmission opportunities among peers to maximize the wireless coding gain. Due to the 




policies have a direct impact on the overall network throughput. In many cases, the gap 
between the optimal and the average is huge. 
Most current research focuses on block scheduling problems. Besides opportunistic 
snooping neighbor states, COPE [70] successfully handles the block scheduling problem by 
intelligently XOR-ing packets. A multi-partner scheduling scheme [74] employs the 
Deadline-aware Network Coding technique to adjust the coding window for meeting the time 
sensitive requirement of media streaming service. An energy-efficient NBgossip scheme [75] 
utilizes network coding for neighborhood gossip in sensor ad hoc networks. The Rarest First 
algorithm is advocated through real experiments from being replaced with source or network 
coding in the Internet [76]. The rarest first idea can be employed in wireless network coding. 
However, directly applying this idea to peer scheduling is not necessarily optimal.  
In this chapter, we redefine a peer scheduling problem in network coding enabled 
wireless networks [73]. Based on the summarized peer scheduling principles, we propose a 
cooperative Peer-to-peer Information Exchange (PIE) scheme with an efficient light-weight 
peer scheduling algorithm. In addition to the rarest first principle on blocks, we take into 
consideration the freshness of peers, which is a measurement on how much innovation a peer 
has against other peers. PIE can not only fully exploit the broadcast nature of wireless 
channels, but also take advantage of cooperative peer-to-peer information exchange. 
Qualitative analysis and extensive simulations demonstrate its effectiveness and efficiency.  
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. In Section 5.1, the network model 
is given. In Section 5.2, we present the peer scheduling principles in network coding enabled 
wireless networks. PIE is proposed in Section 5.3. In Section 5.4, the performance of PIE is 
evaluated in terms of transmission efficiency and computational overhead through extensive 




5.1 Network Model 
We consider a network model similar to that in [73]. A remote Base Station (BS) broadcasts 
a batch of packets (blocks)1 to nodes. Due to the fading and dynamics of cellular channels, 
each peer receives some (maybe all or none) of these blocks. To mitigate the congestion of 
downlinks from the BS to those nodes and release the bottleneck of the BS as a network 
gateway, the nodes can share their received blocks with each other through local wireless 
networks. 
A local wireless network is comprised of several nodes which are also called peers in 
one-hop wireless scenario. These peers can communicate with each other directly through a 
commonly shared wireless channel in a half-duplex mode. In other words, if two peers are 
transmitting at the same time, their signals will interfere with each other, and no peer can 
correctly receive the signal. On the other hand, due to the broadcast nature of wireless 
channels, every other peer can receive the signal and recover the frames correctly when one 
and only one is transmitting. 
Without loss of generality, we assume randomly combined packets sent by a peer are 
linearly independent to each other since the probability of linear dependence is very low [56]. 
Similarly, coded packets sent out from different peers are also assumed linearly independent 
to each other. 







                                                     
 




Table 5.1: List of Notations 
Notation Description 
TRNi Total Receiving Number of Peer i 
DDi Deficiency Degree of Peer i 
TSNi Total Sending Number of Peer i 
NUBi Number of Unique Blocks of Peer i 
BDM (BDV) Block Distribution Matrix (Vector) 
BRM Block Rareness Matrix 
PDM Peer Difference Matrix 
PFV Peer Freshness Vector 
BAPj Benefit of All Peers from the j-th sending operation 
5.2 Investigations on Information Exchange Principles 
Since a specific solution to the peer scheduling problem depends on the original status of the 
block distribution among the peers, we represent the status as a Block Distribution Matrix 
(BDM). A BDM is a (0, 1)-matrix, also known as a binary matrix, in which each element is 
either one or zero. Row numbers and column numbers of a BDM represent peer indexes and 
block indexes, respectively. In other words, BDM(i,  j) = 0 means that peer i does not have 
block j and BDM(i,  j) = 1 means that peer i has block j. Based on a BDM, we summarize the 
following principles. The correlations between the principles and PIE are discussed in 
Subsection 5.3.2. 
Definition 1: The total sending number (TSN) is defined as the total number of sending 
operations performed by all peers as a whole for the completion of the information exchange.  
Proposition I. From the viewpoint of peers, a lower bound of TSN is the maximum 
value among all the sums of DDi and NUBi, i.e., 
 max{ }i iiTSN DD NUB≥ + , (4.25) 
where DDi is the number of innovative packets that peer i needs to recover the whole 




Proof: From the viewpoint of peer i, the TSN for all peers is equal to the sum of TRNi 
and TSNi, i.e., TSN = TRNi + TSNi, where TRNi and TSNi are the numbers of packets that peer 
i receives and sends before the completion of information exchange, respectively. Obviously, 
we have TRNi ≥ DDi and TSNi ≥ NUBi. Thus, we have TSN ≥ DDi + NUBi. Because the 
inequality is true for all peers, we have Eq. (4.25). ■ 
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where N is the number of peers (N ≥ 2). 
Proof: For the j-th sending operation, the benefit of all peers (BAPj) is defined as a 
cumulative value of the benefits received by all peers. Thus, we have BAPj ≤ N – 1. On the 
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Thus, we have Eq. (4.26). ■ 
 
Corollary I. As a summary of Proposition I and Proposition II, a lower bound of TSN is: 
 
1
max ( 1) , max{ }
N
TSN i i iii
LB DD N DD NUB
=
⎧ ⎫⎡ ⎤⎛ ⎞⎪ ⎪= − +⎨ ⎬⎢ ⎥⎜ ⎟
⎝ ⎠⎪ ⎪⎢ ⎥⎩ ⎭
∑ . (4.28) 
Lemma I. In the above network model, for any peer i, incoming packets have no 
innovation to other peers, thus peer i has no necessity to code incoming packets into its future 
outgoing packets. 
Proof: Without loss of generality, let an incoming packet be from peer j. In the above 




peers any more. In addition, it is peer j that codes this packet, which is a linear combination 
of all packets peer j has and thus has no innovation to peer j. Therefore, for any peer i, the 
incoming packet has no innovation to any other peers including peer j and thus peer i has no 
necessity to include the incoming packet into its future outgoing packets. ■ 
 
Proposition III. In the above network model, sending sequences are order-independent. 
Proof: From Lemma I, for a given peer sending sequence, switching the orders of any 
two peers does not change the outcome. In other words, sending sequences are order-
independent. ■ 
5.3 The Proposed PIE Scheme 
Based on the peer scheduling principles, in this section, we propose a quasi-optimal but 
efficient and light-weight cooperative Peer-to-peer Information Exchange (PIE) scheme.  
5.3.1 The PIE Scheme 
The main idea of PIE is to take the freshness of peers into consideration in addition to the 
rarest first principle on blocks. The basic concept of freshness is a measurement on how 
much innovation a peer has against all other peers, which can be represented as follows: 
 { }1 ik jki ij BDV BDV
j j k
PFV PDM >= =∑ ∑∑ , (4.29) 
where PFVi denotes the freshness of peer i, PDMij denotes the difference of peer i against 
peer j, BDVi is the block distribution vector of peer i, which is the i-th row vector of block 

































Figure 5.1: Flow Chart of PIE 
As shown in Figure 5.1, PIE consists of four stages: pre-processing, decision-making, 
status-updating, and termination. The decision-making stage contains two modules with an 
algorithm in each module. The details of these stages and modules are depicted as follows.  
Pre-processing: In PIE, peers first share BDVs with each other. The sharing of BDVs 
can be performed by each peer directly broadcasting BDVs to others through the shared side 
channel. Finally, each peer has the block distribution information of all other peers, which 
forms a BDM.  
With the BDM, each peer can calculate the rareness of blocks and the freshness of peers, 
which are represented in a Block Rareness Matrix (BRM) and a Peer Freshness Vector (PFV), 
respectively. A BRM can be calculated as follows. We first calculate the rareness of each 
block; the rareness of a block denotes the number of peers that have this block; the less the 
value of the rareness of a block, the rarer the block. The block rareness information is 
reorganized and put into the BRM, where the row number denotes the rareness, the column 
number denotes the peer number, and the element value denotes the number of blocks of the 




rareness i. PFV is calculated from PDM, as defined in Eq. (4.29). Another data structure is 
the deficiency degrees (DD) of all peers, which is used as the termination condition of the 
decision-making stage.  
 
Algorithm 1: Peer Scheduling Algorithm 
Input: BRM, PFV 
Output: next_sender 
RBPS ← peers having the rarest blocks in BRM 
MRPS ← peers having the most blocks in RBPS 
if |MRPS| = 1 
    next_sender ← the unique member of MRPS 
else 
    next_sender ← the peer in MRPS with largest freshness 
endif 
return next_sender 
Decision-Making: After pre-processing, each peer can start the decision-making stage, 
which consists of two modules; one is comprised of the peer scheduling algorithm, and the 
other the status refreshing algorithm.  
The peer scheduling algorithm is described in Algorithm 1. First, we choose peers that 
own the rarest blocks and put them into a peer set with rarest blocks (RBPS). Then, peers 
with most blocks are chosen from the RBPS and put into another peer set (MRPS). The next 
sender is the unique peer in MRPS if it contains only one member; otherwise, the peer with 
the largest freshness is chosen as the next sender. The freshness values of peers are taken 
from PFV.  
The status refreshing algorithm plays a crucial role in PIE since the refreshed status will 
affect the next round of peer scheduling. In Algorithm 2, BRM, PDM, PFV, and DD 
represent the information of system status from different aspects. BRM and PFV are for the 
next round of peer scheduling; PDM is for status refreshing; and DD is for the termination of 





Algorithm 2: Status Refreshing Algorithm 
Input: BRM, PDM, PFV, DD, next_sender 
Output: BRM, PDM, PFV, DD 
v_obj ← a rarest block of the next_sender 
rare ← the rareness of the block v_obj 
APS ← peers having the block v_obj 
foreach peer in APS 
    BRM(rare, peer) – – 
endfor 
foreach peer in all peers 
    if PDM(next_sender, peer) > 0 
        foreach member in all peers 
            if PDM(next_sender, member) = 0 
                PDM(member, peer) – – 
                PFV(member) – – 
            endif 
endfor 
DD(peer) – – 
    endif 
endfor 
return BRM, PDM, PFV, DD 
Notice that many data structures are used instead of a single BDM. The reason is that 
for network coding based information exchange, peers send out coded packets, which make it 
difficult to keep tracking the status of block distribution information using a single BDM. 
Finally, in the decision-making stage, PIE gives a peer scheduling sequence, which is 
generated through several rounds of peer scheduling and status refreshing based on the 
initially shared BDM.  
Status-Updating: According to the peer scheduling sequence given in the decision-
making stage, in this stage, peers send out one coded packet at each time without 




reception of new packets. If a packet is lost, a retransmission from the same peer is 
required to complete information exchange. 
Termination: When each peer recovers all original blocks, the whole process is 
completed. If those peers have more information for exchange, they can repeat the above 
process.  
5.3.2 Discussions 
PIE is in line with our summarized principles. For the proof of Proposition I, we have TRNi ≥ 
DDi and TSNi ≥ NUBi. The former principle is observed by PIE, since DDi is decreased by at 
most one in each round of scheduling and refreshing in Algorithm 2. The latter is also 
observed by PIE, since each unique block will make peer i stay in RBPS, resulting in that the 
transmission opportunities will never be scheduled to other peers with only larger-rareness 
blocks. In other words, from the viewpoint of blocks, before all peers which have unique 









= − ≤∑ ∑ , (4.31) 
where |NUB| and |DD| are the sums of all NUBi’s and all DDi’s, respectively. Thus, PIE is 
naturally in accordance with the Proposition I. Moreover, according to Algorithm 2, we can 
see that the BAPj is no larger than N – 1, making PIE conform to the Proposition II. Finally, 
following Proposition I and Proposition II, the Corollary I naturally holds.  
From Eq. (4.29), it can be seen that freshness is a cumulative difference of a peer 
against other peers. Thus, the concept of freshness represents a measurement of possible 
innovation a peer has against other peers. This definition captures the essence of network 
coding based information exchange in terms of innovative information, thus assisting to 




5.4 Performance Evaluation 
To verify the effectiveness and efficiency of PIE, we conduct extensive simulations for 
performance evaluation. In our simulation, each peer can successfully receive the original 
blocks from a BS with a prescribed probability. We define the probability as the sparsity 
degree of the original blocks. The performance of PIE is evaluated and also compared with 
the rarest first algorithm in terms of transmission efficiency and computational overhead.  




























Figure 5.2: Efficiency vs. the Number of Peers (Sparsity = 0.8) 
The theoretical lower bound of TSN in Corollary I is adopted as the benchmark for the 





= = , (4.32) 
where Et is transmission efficiency, TTA is the total transmission amount of information 
exchange, TSN is our simulation result, and LB is the theoretical lower bound of TSN, as 




LB OPT TSN≤ ≤ , where OPT denotes the optimal solution. Thus, we know PIE is near to 
the optimal in terms of transmission efficiency when Et is near to 1.  
5.4.1 Transmission Efficiency 
Figure 5.2 shows the transmission efficiency versus the number of peers. It can be seen that 
the transmission efficiency of PIE is much higher, about 30% on average, than that of the 
rarest first algorithm. With the increase of the number of peers, the transmission efficiency of 
PIE increases and almost reaches its theoretical upper bound. Simulation results with 
different numbers of blocks (n = 10, 15, 20) are given for extensive verification.  




























Figure 5.3: Efficiency vs. the Number of Blocks (Sparsity = 0.8) 
The transmission efficiency versus the number of blocks is shown in Figure 5.3. It can 
be seen again that PIE outperforms the rarest first algorithm. With the increase of the number 
of blocks, the transmission efficiencies of both schemes decrease; while PIE still maintains 




different numbers of peers (m = 4, 8, and 12) are shown respectively for extensive 
verification. A more extensive comparison between PIE and the rarest first algorithm in 
terms of transmission efficiency is shown in Figure 5.4. 
Figure 5.5 shows the transmission efficiency versus the sparsity degree with different 
numbers of peers (m = 5, 10, and 15) and different numbers of blocks (n = 5, 10, and 15). 
Both schemes have the almost same changing trend, while PIE outperforms the rarest first 







































































Figure 5.5: Efficiency vs. Sparsity 
5.4.2 Computational Overhead 
The computational overheads of PIE and the rarest first algorithm are shown in Figure 5.6, 
where all the computational overheads are collected from a laptop platform with a CPU of 
Intel Pentium M 1.8GHz and a RAM of 512MB. It can be seen that the computational 
overhead of the rarest first algorithm increases almost linearly with the sparsity degree, while 
that of PIE decreases almost linearly. Furthermore, the computational overhead of PIE still 




































Figure 5.6: Computational Overhead vs. Sparsity (PIE and Rarest First) 
5.5 Summary 
In this chapter, we have proposed a cooperative Peer-to-peer Information Exchange (PIE) 
scheme with a compact, efficient, and light-weight peer scheduling algorithm for network 
coding enabled wireless networks. PIE can not only fully exploit the broadcast nature of 
wireless channels, but also take advantage of cooperative peer-to-peer information exchange. 
Qualitative analysis and extensive simulations have demonstrated the effectiveness and 





Conclusions and Future Work 
In this chapter, the contributions of this thesis are concluded, followed by the future work.  
6.1 Conclusions 
The major contributions of this thesis can be summarized as follows. We studied the 
characteristics of MWNs and pointed out four research challenges on the information 
security for MWNs. To prevent the identified security threats and protect the information 
security of MWNs, we proposed three research topics focusing on the above-mentioned 
research challenges.  
In MWNs, traffic analysis and flow tracing attacks are very challenging security threats, 
and these attacks may be utilized by adversaries to compromise the privacy of users, such as 
the source anonymity. To prevent traffic analysis and flow tracing attacks in MWNs, we 
proposed a network coding based privacy-preserving scheme to achieve source anonymity. 
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first research on using network coding to achieve 
privacy preservation. Asissted with HEFs, the proposed scheme utilize the mixing feature of 
network coding to confuse the adversaries. This scheme can offer two significant privacy-
preserving features, packet flow untraceability and message content confidentiality; these 
two privacy features can together help to achieve the privacy objective, source anonymity.  
A stronger privacy objective, source unobservability, can be achieved if a scheme which 
can provide source anonymity is combined with dummy messages. However, dummy 
messages may bring the explosion of network traffic, which may further cause severe 
performance degradation or even service denial. Existing schemes rely on trusted proxies to 
filter dummy messages and thus to avoid traffic explosion. However, in MWNs, trusted 
proxies suffer from compromising attacks and may be compromised. It is arguable that it is 




We investigated this challenging issue from a different viewpoint and utilized network 
coding to absorb those dummy messages instead of filtering them. To prevent traffic 
explosion for ensuring system availability while achieving the privacy objective of source 
unobservability at the same time, we proposed a privacy-preserving scheme based on 
network coding and dummy messages for MWNs. Dummy messages utilized in the proposed 
scheme are specially designed; however, adversaries cannot distinguish them from real ones 
since they always appears in their ciphertext format. Network coding is utilized in this 
scheme to automatically absorb these dummy messages, and thus traffic explosion induced 
DoS can be naturally avoided to ensure the system availability.  
Other than the system availability, we also explored a data availability issue. We 
defined an information exchange issue when remote base stations are temporarily unavailable 
or intermittent. We referred to this issue as the peer scheduling issue, and the optimal peer 
scheduling solution is proven NP-hard. To enhance the data availability among peers when 
the remote base station is temporarily unavailable or intermittent, we propose a cooperative 
peer-to-peer information exchange scheme. Network coding is utilized in the scheme and 
peers are scheduled to send network-coded packets to cooperatively share the information 
with each other. The proposed scheme can achieve a quasi-optimal peer-to-peer information 
exchange in terms of throughput and transmission delay.  
6.2 Future Work 
Our research has made significant progress in the information security of MWNs. Yet this is 
still a very wide open field. There are several research directions to be explored to 
complement our efforts.  
6.2.1 Privacy Preservation for DTNs 
Delay/Disruption Tolerant Networks (DTNs) [77] are very hot research topic in recent years. 




unique features such as lack of end-to-end connection, fragmentation, and bundle 
accumulation. These unique features pose new challenges to the information security, 
especially privacy preservation, of DTNs.  
Privacy preservation is a new research topic in DTNs and has received little attention. 
The existing privacy-preserving technologies such as mix-net and onion routing are not 
suitable for DTNs. Considering the unique characteristics of DTNs, we will carefully 
examine the existing privacy-preserving schemes and design new privacy-preserving 
schemes for DTNs.  
6.2.2 Enhancing Data Availability for DTNs 
As a kind of MWNs, DTNs characterize themselves with a series of unique features such as 
lack of end-to-end connection, fragmentation, and bundle accumulation. These three unique 
features pose great challenges to the information security of DTNs. For example, the lack of 
end-to-end connection and fragmentation features will severely degrade the data availability 
in DTNs, which is one of our future research topics.  
A good bundle accumulation mechanism may greatly enhance the data availability in 
DTNs. However, a single bundle accumulation mechanism may not able to achieve the 
desired data availability level. In this sense, a whole-set design of DTNs may be preferred for 
the enhancement of data availability. On the other hand, network coding has many desired 
features such as block scheduling easiness and multiple data delivery, which can be utilized 
for enhancing data availability in DTNs. We will consider including network coding into our 
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